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INTRODUCTION 
In their Opposition, plaintiffs use two techniques to avoid addressing the merits of 
the many errors that tainted the trial and dictated the jury's verdict in this case. First and 
foremost, plaintiffs try to hide those errors behind a veil of self-serving and unjustifiable 
factual assertions that are irrelevant to the errors of law committed below. Second, when 
plaintiffs are forced to justify the District Court's legal rulings, they seek radically to 
rewrite settled law. Neither approach should deflect this Court from the fundamental 
legal errors that require reversal of the judgment against defendants. 
It should now be clear that this appeal principally presents questions of law, not 
fact. Plaintiffs concede that the following issues present pure questions of law that this 
Court reviews de novo: (1) whether the District Court erred in granting plaintiffs a partial 
directed verdict, and a peremptory jury instruction, that, as a matter of law, Wiley Rein & 
Fielding ('Wiley Rein") had an implied attorney-client relationship with plaintiffs; 
(2) whether the District Court violated Utah's comparative fault statute by preventing the 
jury from apportioning fault among all defendants and all plaintiffs; and (3) whether the 
District Court improperly refused to give the jury any instruction on defendants' special 
defenses of waiver and estoppel, thereby effectively granting plaintiffs a directed verdict 
on these critical defenses. See Pis.' Br. at 1. 
Furthermore, while plaintiffs try to recast other legal issues as mixed questions of 
fact and law, plaintiffs cannot support such wishful thinking. It is clear, therefore, that 
the following errors by the District Court present additional questions of law for this 
Court: (4) allowing the jury to measure damages as of the date of trial, long after the date 
of defendants' last conceivable breach of duty; (5) permitting the jury to award lost 
ownership and cash distribution damages based on hypothetical and speculative estimates 
of plaintiffs' damage expert; and (6) letting the jury award compensatory damages (and 
in Richard Wiley's case, punitive damages) for a 1991 "cash call," even though plaintiffs 
admit they never suffered any harm or out-of-pocket loss as a result of the cash call. 
Rather than devote space to briefing these important legal issues, plaintiffs 
squander most of their allotted 140 pages on a self-serving and slanted version of the 
"facts" and an impermissible cross-appeal. Plaintiffs even submit an additional 20-page 
appendix purporting to correct alleged misstatements of the record.1 The reason plaintiffs 
seek refuge in these alleged "facts" is all too obvious - plaintiffs cannot justify the 
District Court's rulings on the basis of the law. 
Plaintiffs' singular focus on their version of events is particularly indefensible in 
light of the procedural posture in which many of the District Court's rulings arise. For, 
while plaintiffs conspicuously avoid mentioning it, the District Court granted them partial 
directed verdicts on several key issues. The court expressly granted plaintiffs a directed 
Defendants will not burden this Court with a point-by-point response to the rhetoric and 
accusations that permeate plaintiffs' Appendix. Suffice it to say that defendants did not 
misstate the evidence and they are confident that a neutral review of the record citations 
provided in defendants' briefs will expose plaintiffs' assertions for what they a re -
unfounded. Defendants showed their adherence to the record by providing in their brief 
direct quotations to key testimony and exhibits (principally plaintiffs' own witnesses and 
exhibits) and by submitting an addendum containing important portions of the record 
cited in the brief. The same cannot be said for plaintiffs, who often give no citations or 
quotations to support their version of the facts. In this reply, defendants point out a 
number of plaintiffs' misstatements and distortions, putting the actual evidence and 
rulings of the District Court in the context of the legal issues presented. 
2 
verdict (and a peremptory jury instruction) when it ruled, as a matter of law, that Wiley 
Rein and plaintiffs had an implied attorney-client relationship from 1988 through 1991. 
The District Court also effectively directed partial verdicts for plaintiffs by refusing to 
allow the jury to apportion fault among all plaintiffs and by failing to give the jury any 
instructions on defendants' affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel. 
It is well-established that when reviewing a directed verdict, an appellate court is 
required to examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See 
Nav v. General Motors Corp.. 850 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Utah 1993); Alta Health Strategies. 
Inc. v. CCI Mech. Serv.. 930 P.2d 280, 282 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Plaintiffs therefore are 
wrong to assert that the Court must view all of the facts "in the light most favorable" to 
them. See Pis.' Br. at 7. Quite the opposite is true for many issues presented by this 
appeal: the existence of an implied attorney-client relationship; comparative fault; and 
waiver and estoppel. As a consequence, to the extent facts are relevant to these issues of 
law at all, this Court must credit the evidence supporting defendants' position and 
disregard plaintiffs' self-serving version of the facts. 
When plaintiffs do address the law, they repeatedly advance positions that require 
this Court to alter Utah law fundamentally. Remarkably, plaintiffs do so without ever 
acknowledging the profound changes they propose and without any regard for the 
implications of the positions they urge. Most significantly, plaintiffs effectively ask this 
Court to overturn Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985), and to adopt an 
"exception" to Utah's long-standing entity rule that is unprecedented in American law 
and that would, by its own terms, obliterate the entity rule. 
3 
Plaintiffs also make no attempt to distinguish the many cases cited in defendants' 
brief or even to argue that they were wrongly decided. Instead, plaintiffs simply ignore 
case after case in the apparent hope that if they ignore relevant authority, perhaps this 
Court will do the same. For example, in their opening brief, defendants discussed this 
Court's recent decision in Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 970 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1998). 
Gildea held that a breach of fiduciary duty claim requires evidence of actual disclosure or 
misuse of confidential information. Speculation that confidential information "must 
have" been disclosed or misused - the precise argument plaintiffs advance in this case -
is legally insufficient to support such a claim. Id. at 1270. Yet, plaintiffs do not discuss 
or even cite Gildea. Plaintiffs also never address or acknowledge the abundant 
authorities (including Utah decisions and even the writings of their own trial expert) that 
state unequivocally that damages must be measured as of the date of a breach, not, as 
plaintiffs argue, years later when a case finally proceeds to trial. 
Plaintiffs' assertions of wrongdoing, no matter how vigorously stated, do not give 
them the right to ignore controlling authority or to rewrite settled law to sustain an 
unsupportable verdict. By elevating their desire for a verdict over the rule of law, 
plaintiffs led the District Court into numerous errors that resulted in a flawed and unjust 
verdict. Plaintiffs must now reap what they have sown. This Court should set aside the 
jury's verdict and reverse the judgment of the District Court in its entirety. 
4 
ARGUMENTS COMMON TO WILEY REIN AND RICHARD WILEY 
I. Plaintiffs' Reading Of Margulies Bears No Relationship To Its Text And 
Would Rewrite Utah Law. 
Plaintiffs make two important concessions regarding the District Court's error in 
granting plaintiffs a directed verdict and peremptory jury instruction that, as a matter of 
law, Wiley Rein had an implied attorney-client relationship with plaintiffs from May 
1988 through the December 1991 cash call. First, plaintiffs have abandoned the central 
argument from their post-trial briefs that the District Court's error was harmless. See 
R.20753-20879 (Feb. 16, 1999 Plaintiffs' JNOV Opp. at 3-7). Plaintiffs now 
acknowledge what should be obvious: If the District Court erred in granting plaintiffs a 
partial directed verdict and peremptory instruction on this point, that error necessarily 
prejudiced defendants and requires - at a minimum - a new trial. 
Second, and for good reason, plaintiffs make no effort to argue that they fit within 
the "reasonable belief exception to the well-established rule - the entity rule - under 
which an attorney representing a limited partnership ordinarily represents the entity only 
and not the limited partners. As discussed in defendants' opening brief, this Court held in 
Margulies that a factfinder may imply an attorney-client relationship between a 
partnership's attorney and its limited partners if, based on all of the facts and 
circumstances, the individual partners reasonably believed that the partnership's attorney 
also represented their individual (as opposed to partnership) interests. See 696 P.2d at 
1200-01. Here, however, the District Court expressly ruled that plaintiffs' professed 
belief that Wiley Rein represented them from 1988 through 1991 was unreasonable in 
5 
light of the undisputed facts. See R.16852-16869 (Aug. 21, 1998 Mem. Decision at 15). 
Plaintiffs never challenge this ruling. Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot - and do not -
argue that the "reasonable belief exception recognized in Margulies applies and supports 
the District Court's ruling that, as a matter of law, an attorney-client relationship existed 
between plaintiffs and Wiley Rein from 1988 through 1991. 
In light of plaintiffs' concessions, this Court is faced with only two questions: 
(1) whether plaintiffs are correct in arguing that Margulies created a "separate, 
alternative" exception to the entity rule under which a court would be required to find 
that an attorney-client relationship exists between individual limited partners and the law 
firm that represents a limited partnership whenever the partnership is asserting its rights 
against the limited partners; and (2) whether this second exception applies as a matter of 
law and allowed the District Court to take away from the jury the fact question of 
whether an attorney-client relationship existed between plaintiffs and Wiley Rein. The 
jury's verdict can be sustained only if this Court answers both of these questions in the 
affirmative. However, for the reasons stated below and in defendants' opening brief, this 
Court should answer each of these questions in the negative. Accordingly, the judgment 
of the District Court should be reversed. 
As discussed in defendants' opening brief, the District Court concluded correctly that it 
was not reasonable for plaintiffs to believe that Wiley Rein represented them after Barry 
Wood left the firm in September 1987. See R.16852-16869; see also Defs.' Br. at 26, 48-
50 (discussing additional undisputed facts, such as plaintiff Joseph Lee's writing Wiley 
Rein to terminate plaintiffs' relationship with the firm, and plaintiffs' filing of a lawsuit 
against Wiley Rein, showing that plaintiffs could not believe that Wiley Rein represented 
them in the 1988-1991 time period). 
6 
A. Plaintiffs' Argument Is Contrary To Margulies. 
As an initial matter, this Court should reject plaintiffs' effort to rewrite the 
Margulies decision. Aware that they are bound by the District Court's ruling that they 
could not reasonably have believed Wiley Rein represented them after September 1987, 
plaintiffs argue that Margulies announced a second, unprecedented exception to the rule 
that an attorney representing a limited partnership does not also represent the individual 
interests of the limited partners. See Pis.' Br. at 47-53. Under this purported "second test 
for implying an attorney-client relationship" - which plaintiffs call the "direct 
involvement" exception to the entity rule - a law firm representing a limited partnership 
will always be deemed, as a matter of law, to have an attorney-client relationship with 
each of the individual limited partners whenever the law firm is handling matters that 
may affect the "financial viability and success of the partnership." See id. at 49-51. 
Plaintiffs' contrivance finds no support in Margulies-or in any other reported decision -
and would, if accepted, swallow the entity rule whole. 
A simple reading of Margulies rebuts plaintiffs' claim that this Court created two 
"separate, alternative" exceptions to the entity rule. Rather, Margulies recognized that in 
the context of a disqualification motion, even if there is no express attorney-client 
relationship, "circumstances may give rise to an implied professional relationship or a 
3
 Notably, plaintiffs cite no decision or other authority from Utah - nor from any other 
jurisdiction - supporting either their reading of Margulies or the existence of a "direct 
involvement" exception to the entity rule. In fact, commentators have long noted that this 
Court in Margulies merely applied the well-recognized "reasonable belief exception to 
the entity rule. See, e.g.. K. Saulsbury, Beyond the Attorney-Client Relationship: The 
Implied Professional Relationship. 18 J. Legal Prof. 351-52 (1993). 
7 
fiduciary duty toward the client." 696 P.2d at 1200 (emphasis added). In determining 
what those "circumstances" might be in the context of that case, this Court looked to 
federal precedent in which a district court had found that a corporate officer "reasonably 
believed" an attorney was representing him personally despite the attorney's disavowal of 
any attorney-client relationship. Id (citing E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown. 305 F. Supp. 
371, 387-92 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (granting motion to disqualify attorney because it was 
reasonable for officer to believe he was personally represented by corporation's attorney 
who entered appearance on his behalf)). 
The focus of the Court in Margulies was, therefore, fixed firmly on the 
reasonableness of the individual partners' professed belief that in the bank lawsuit the 
Jones Waldo law firm was representing both the partnership and the individual partners. 
Since that lawsuit was directly "aimed at preventing foreclosure on the individual letters 
of credit," id. at 1198, this Court agreed with the trial court that "it was not at all 
unreasonable for the limited partners to believe that Jones, Waldo was acting for their 
individual interests as well as the interests of the partnership in that litigation." Id. at 
1200 (emphasis added). 
This Court's reference to "direct involvement" in Margulies was not intended to, 
and did not, create an additional exception to the entity rule. Rather, the reference to 
direct involvement appears in a portion of the opinion in which the Court explained the 
limited nature of the reasonable belief exception: 
It should be noted that we do not find that an attorney automatically 
becomes counsel for limited partners when he or she undertakes 
representation of a limited partnership If the limited partners stand to 
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gain nothing more from the attorney's representation of the limited 
partnership than the incidental gain which will accrue to them as partners, 
and not in their individual capacities, no attorney-client relationship should 
be implied. When, however, the individual interests of the limited partners 
are directly involved, as they are here, there may be sufficient grounds for 
implying the existence of an attorney-client relationship. 
Id. at 1200-01 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court's use of the phrase 
"directly involved, as they are here" in the above-quoted passage merely underscores that 
in the bank lawsuit Jones Waldo was affirmatively representing and furthering the 
personal interests of the individual limited partners "in their individual capacities," and 
not merely as members of a limited partnership. There is no principled basis for twisting 
this statement from Margulies -which merely explains the limits on when it is reasonable 
for a limited partner to believe that the firm representing the partnership is also 
representing the partners' individual interests - into creation of an unprecedented "direct 
involvement" exception to the entity rule. 
In fact, to adopt plaintiffs' "direct involvement" exception to the entity rule would 
not merely twist this Court's language in Margulies beyond recognition - it would also 
overrule that decision. In the present case, for example, plaintiffs claim that the "direct 
involvement" exception applies because decisions made by MWT Ltd. - the limited 
partnership that Wiley Rein represented - affected the "financial viability and success" of 
the partnership (and therefore "the value of their partnership interest") and also might 
have subjected them, as limited partners, "to a claim of personal liability if those 
decisions led to the demise and dissolution of the partnership." Pis.' Br. at 51-52. If 
plaintiffs were correct that this sort of "direct involvement" were sufficient to trump 
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application of the entity rule, then any law firm representing a limited partnership would 
automatically be deemed also to represent each limited partner, because a partnership's 
decisions always have some effect on the partnership's success or viability or some 
impact on the value of the limited partners' interests. But Margulies rightly holds that 
this kind of "incidental" effect that "accruefs] to [limited partners] as partners" is not 
sufficient to permit a trier of fact to imply an attorney-client relationship between a law 
firm representing a limited partnership and its limited partners. 696 P.2d at 1200-01. 
Furthermore, Margulies expressly affirmed the trial court's finding of an attorney-
client relationship because in the bank lawsuit the Jones Waldo law firm was "acting for" 
the individual interests of the limited partners. Id. at 1200. That is why the Court looked 
to what "the limited partners st[ood] to gain" from Jones Waldo's representation. Id. 
(emphasis added). Here, however, plaintiffs have always asserted that in representing 
MWT Ltd., Wiley Rein was harming their interests and acting adverse to the limited 
partners. Nothing in Margulies suggests that when a law firm is representing a 
partnership in matters adverse to its limited partners, a court may imply an attorney-client 
relationship between the law firm and the individual partners. 
There should be little question that plaintiffs' "direct involvement" exception, if 
accepted, would wholly obliterate the entity rule and would effectively prevent a limited 
partnership from ever seeking an attorney's assistance in resolving disputes with its 
limited partners. In each such case, an individual partner's interests would always be 
"directly involved," as plaintiffs have defined their exception, since the success or 
viability of the partnership or the value of partnership interests might be affected by the 
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partnership's decisions. In those circumstances, therefore, the law firm would always be 
deemed to represent both the limited partnership and the individual partners, thereby 
creating a built-in conflict of interest. Plaintiffs' "direct involvement" exception would 
thus prevent a law firm from ever representing a limited partnership (or, by logical 
extension, a corporation) in matters adverse to the interests of the limited partners (or 
shareholders). No decision or commentary supports such a nonsensical exception to the 
entity rule. In fact, courts throughout the country, including this Court in Margulies. have 
recognized that an attorney must be free to represent a partnership's interests separate 
from the interests of individual partners. See id, at 1200 ("A limited partnership is an 
entity equivalent to a corporation... and therefore representation of a limited partnership 
does not of itself require allegiance to the interests of the limited partners."); Defs.' Br. at 
51-52 (citing cases). That is undoubtedly why plaintiffs never address the adverse policy 
implications of adopting their truly bizarre exception to the entity rule. 
B. The District Court Erred In Taking From The Jury The Question Of 
The Existence Of An Attorney-Client Relationship. 
Even if this Court were to accept plaintiffs' novel exception to the entity rule, the 
jury's verdict may not be sustained because the District Court erred in taking from the 
jury the question of whether an attorney-client relationship existed between plaintiffs and 
Wiley Rein. In Margulies. this Court made clear that whether an attorney-client 
relationship "may" be implied from the circumstances is a question of fact. Id. at 1200. 
Yet, at plaintiffs' urging, the District Court took this fact question away from the jury and 
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ruled that Wiley Rein had an implied attorney-client relationship with the limited partners 
as a matter of law. At a minimum, this error requires a new trial. 
Plaintiffs cite no decision holding that the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship can be decided as a matter of law, as the District Court did in this case.4 
Certainly, Margulies does not say that, and plaintiffs simply ignore other Utah decisions 
that are directly contrary to their argument. See Sorenson v. Beers. 585 P.2d 458, 460 
(Utah 1978) (dispute over existence of attorney-client relationship is a factual one 
sufficient to make summary judgment inappropriate); Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 
799 P.2d 716, 729 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that "whether an attorney-client 
relationship exist[s]" is a "fundamental factual issue"). Tellingly, plaintiffs even ignore 
the writings of their own expert at trial, who has stated that "[w]hether the attorney-client 
relationship existed presents an issue for the trier of fact." 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal 
Malpractice § 8.3, at 565 (4th ed. 1996) (hereinafter "Mallen, Legal Malpractice"). 
In Utah, a reviewing court must reverse a directed verdict if there was any 
competent evidence supporting the nonmoving party's position and must consider the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Nay. 850 P.2d at 1263 ("We 
reverse a directed verdict when the evidence, taken in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant."); 
4
 David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tullev. 203 Cal. App. 3d 884, 890 (1988), cited by 
plaintiffs, has no application to this case. Welch holds only that, given the existence of 
an attorney-client relationship, "the existence of the [fiduciary] duty is a question of law." 
Id. at 890. In Welch, the existence of an attorney-client relationship was not in dispute. 
See id. at 889. 
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Alta Health Strategies, 930 P.2d at 284 ("[A] party who moves for a directed verdict has 
the very difficult burden of showing no evidence exists that raises a question of material i 
fact."). Here, the evidence supporting plaintiffs' claim of an attorney-client relationship 
is nonexistent. Indeed, the record conclusively shows that from 1988 through 1991: 
(1) Wiley Rein did not represent any plaintiff; (2) at all times during this period, plaintiffs 
were individually represented and billed by Ralph Hardy and his firm Dow Lohnes in 
connection with all dealings with MWT Ltd.; and (3) by 1990, plaintiffs had even sued { 
Wiley Rein and Richard Wiley in this lawsuit, thereby completely destroying any 
conceivable attorney-client relationship. See Defs.' Br. at 25-30, 41-42, 48-50 (citing 
record).5 In the face of such evidence, it is impossible to conclude - a s the District Court 
did -that, as a matter of law, Wiley Rein represented plaintiffs' individual interests from 
1988 through the cash call in 1991. The District Court's directed verdict and peremptory 
instruction are unsustainable. See Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co.. 905 P.2d 297, 299 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) ('Where there is any evidence that raises a question of material 
fact . . . judgment as a matter of law is improper.") (emphasis added).6 
5
 Plaintiffs are wrong to maintain that defendants must marshal all evidence in support of 
the District Court's partial directed verdict. See, e.g.. Pis.' Br. at 46-47. The rule that 
appellants must "marshal the evidence" applies only when an appellant is challenging 
factual findings. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). This marshalling requirement has no 
application where, as here, a defendant is challenging a directed verdict for plaintiff. 
6
 As an afterthought, plaintiffs also suggest that this Court should disregard the District 
Court's directed verdict because Wiley Rein had an alleged continuing duty of loyalty to 
former clients. See Pis.' Br. at 53-55. However, this argument is entirely dependent on 
two premises that are false. One premise is that defendants "admit" that Wiley Rein 
represented the individual plaintiffs until Barry Wood left Wiley Rein in September 
1987. See id. at 54. Defendants did no such thing, and none of plaintiffs' citations to the 
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In sum, the District Court wrongly told the jury that, as a matter of law, Wiley 
Rein was the guardian of plaintiffs' individual interests from 1988 through 1991, a time 
when, as the record showed, Wiley Rein was representing only the interests of MWT Ltd. 
and Northstar in matters plaintiffs considered adverse to their interests. The court's 
peremptory instruction, coupled with its broadly worded instructions on the scope of a 
law firm's duty to its clients, effectively directed the jury, contrary to the evidence, to 
find that defendants breached their duty of loyalty to plaintiffs and to award plaintiffs 
millions for actions taken by MWT Ltd. and Northstar between 1988 and 1991. Because 
the District Court's error irrevocably tainted the verdict, this Court should reverse the 
judgment against defendants. 
II. The District Court Erred In Preventing The Jury From Considering The 
Fault Of All Plaintiffs. 
Just as plaintiffs ask this Court to ignore the plain language of Margulies and to 
adopt an "exception" to the entity rule that would undermine the rule's very purpose, 
record supports this assertion. Rather, each cite merely corroborates what defendants do 
not deny: Wiley Rein had an attorney-client relationship with the general partnership 
Mountain West Television Company from 1981 to 1986, not with the individual 
plaintiffs. See Defs.' Br. at 40. Indeed, had defendants admitted that Wiley Rein 
represented plaintiffs during this period, the District Court could never have ruled, as it 
did, that there were disputed issues of fact as to the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship between Wiley Rein and the plaintiffs between 1981 and 1986, a ruling 
plaintiffs do not challenge. See R. 19657-19661. The second false premise of plaintiffs' 
argument is that the jury found that an attorney-client relationship existed between Wiley 
Rein and plaintiffs prior to 1987. See Pis.' Br. at 54-55. The jury made no such finding. 
See R.20429-20433. The District Court precluded any consideration by the jury of the 
attorney-client issue with its directed verdict and peremptory instruction, which required 
the jury to find an attorney-client relationship existed. Accordingly, the jury never made 
any independent determination that an attorney-client relationship existed between Wiley 
Rein and plaintiffs prior to 1987. 
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plaintiffs also want this Court to disregard the express language, legislative history and 
intent of Utah's comparative fault statute. Plaintiffs urge a reading of the comparative 
fault statute that would turn the statute on its head and would violate its "main purpose" 
of ensuring that defendants pay only their fair share of liability. See Sullivan v. Scoular 
Grain Co.. 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993) (citing to legislative history) ('The defendant 
ought to be on the hook only for its own percentage of damages, but ought not be the 
guarantor for everyone else's damages."). 
As detailed in defendants' opening brief, the provisions of Utah's comparative 
fault statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43 (Supp. 2000) ("the Act"), 
together achieve this "fair share" objective. See Defs.' Br. at 61-62. The Act provides 
courts with a straightforward rule - "the maximum amount for which a defendant may be 
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages 
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-40(1); see also id § 78-27-38(3). Section 78-27-39 then sets forth 
the mechanism that ensures that this statutory mandate is met: 'The trial court may, and 
when requested by any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts 
determining the total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributable to each person seeking recovery [and] to each defendant...." Id § 78-
27-39(1) (emphasis added). The Act is unambiguous. Once requested by any party, the 
trial court must direct the jury to determine the fault of each plaintiff and each defendant. 
The District Court ignored this statutory directive. 
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A. Defendants Did Not Need To File Counterclaims. 
Rather than address the Act's clear requirements, plaintiffs ask this Court to accept 
the notion that, when the District Court held during trial that the jury needed to determine 
plaintiffs' damages individually, the court's ruling (the "November 13 Ruling") somehow 
magically "created [eleven] separate and distinct complaints on behalf of each plaintiff 
against both defendants." Pis.' Br. at 58. It follows, according to plaintiffs, that the Act 
required defendants to file counterclaims against these new "nonparties" in order for the 
jury to consider their fault. Id. at 58-59. Plaintiffs are wrong for three reasons: (1) the 
District Court never transformed this case into separate actions; (2) the Act does not 
require a defendant to file counterclaims in order for a factfinder to apportion fault among 
all parties to an action; and (3) the Act's 1999 amendments confirm that the Act has 
never required the filing of counterclaims before the trial court is required to direct the 
jury to apportion fault to each person potentially liable for a plaintiffs injuries. 
First, plaintiffs point to no portion of the record that supports their assertion that 
the District Court or the parties ever viewed the court's November 13 Ruling as creating 
eleven separate actions. See id. at 57-58. There is good reason for this failure - the 
record shows just the opposite. For example, the District Court's jury instruction 
implementing the November 13 Ruling describes just one action. Furthermore, every 
7
 See R.20362 (Jury Inst. No. 20) ("Although there are 11 plaintiffs in this action, it does 
not follow from that fact alone that if one plaintiff is entitled to recover, all plaintiffs are 
entitled to recover. Each plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, every element of a claim alleged against a particular defendant before that 
plaintiff may recover as against that defendant.") (emphasis added). 
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pleading filed after the November 13 Ruling (including every motion and brief filed by 
plaintiffs) demonstrates that there was only one case, with one district court docket 
number and one caption collectively naming all of the plaintiffs. 
The reality of what occurred below is simple. The District Court correctly 
recognized that this case involved "eleven different plaintiffs with varying interests" and 
that a collective damage award, therefore, was patently inappropriate. R. 18983-18984. 
The District Court did nothing more than apply the basic rule of law that each plaintiff 
must individually establish that he or she is entitled to recovery. See, e.g.. Atkin Wright 
& Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985). 
Significantly, the District Court never ruled or even suggested (on November 13 or at any 
other time) that defendants must file counterclaims before they would be permitted to 
exercise their statutory right to have the jury apportion fault among all plaintiffs and all 
defendants. Nor did the court suggest, even in its rulings on post-verdict motions, that 
defendants' failure to file counterclaims precluded them from having the fault of all 
plaintiffs considered. Plaintiffs' argument is pure fiction, motivated by their justifiable 
concern that the District Court's action is unsustainable, and this Court should reject it. 
Second^ plaintiffs mistakenly argue that section 78-27-41 of the Act required 
defendants to join co-plaintiffs as defendants "or risk[] being found liable for more than 
[their] proportionate share of fault." See Pis.' Br. at 61. By its plain terms, however, that 
section merely allows - but does not require - defendants to bring other persons into a 
case "for the purpose of having determined their respective proportions of fault." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-41(1). Thus, the provision states that defendants "may" join other 
17 
parties for the purposes of apportioning fault. Id Plaintiffs argue that the legislature 
really meant that defendants "must" file a claim in order "to have the proportionate fault 
of'any person/ other than the claiming party, determined " Pis.' Br. at 60-61. Yet, 
plaintiffs cite no legislative history to support their reading of the permissive "may" as a 
mandatory "must." Plaintiffs also ignore the rule of statutory construction that a court 
must "assume the legislature used each term advisedly [and must] give effect to each 
term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." State v. Candelario. 909 P.2d 277, 
278 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Utah, as 
elsewhere, "[according to its ordinary construction, the term "may" means permissive." 
State ex rel. M.C. & K.S. v. K.H.C.. 940 P.2d 1229,1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Section 78-27-41 serves two purposes, each of which is consistent with the Act's 
"fair share" objective. First, this provision permits, but does not require, named 
defendants to bring nonparties into a case so that their fault can be included in the 
apportionment process. In addition, as discussed below, section 78-27-41 provides a 
procedural mechanism for a defendant to assert an individual claim for apportionment 
against a party who may be dismissed from the action as a matter of law. Neither 
situation is present here. Accordingly, defendants' failure to invoke a permissive and 
plainly inapplicable provision cannot possibly be used to require defendants to answer for 
more than their share of fault for plaintiffs' damages. 
Unable to find any case adopting their reading of the Act, plaintiffs cite a trilogy 
of cases -National Serv. Indus.. Inc. v. B.W. Norton Mfg. Co.. 937 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997); Packer v. National Serv. Indus.. Inc.. 909 P.2d 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); 
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and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav Saints v. Queen Carpet Corp.. 5 F. Supp. 2d 
1246 (D. Utah 1998) - to support their argument that defendants were required to file 
counterclaims against plaintiffs in order to have their fault considered in determining 
liability. Because none of these cases involved defendants seeking to apportion fault to 
co-plaintiffs, the decisions provide no support for plaintiffs' arguments. 
Combined, Norton. Packer and Queen Carpet stand for three related propositions, 
none of which advance plaintiffs' cause: (1) since the enactment of Utah's comparative 
fault statute, no actions seeking to redistribute loss based on degree of fault may be 
brought separately from the underlying action; (2) the Act ordinarily requires a court, 
when requested and regardless of whether a counterclaim has been filed, to consider other 
tortfeasors' fault when awarding damages; and (3) when a co-defendant may be 
dismissed from the action as a matter of law, a defendant should file counterclaims 
against the co-defendant to preserve the right to seek apportionment from that dismissed 
co-defendant. As the court in Norton explained: 
Under the Act, the trier of fact must take other tortfeasor's culpability into 
consideration when making any damages awards, even if a cross-claim is 
not or could not be filed Thus, tortfeasor codefendants do not 
necessarily need to file a cross-claim to ensure that any other tortfeasor's 
culpability is determined. However, if the trial court rules as a matter of 
law that a codefendant bears no liability, then the fact-finder does not 
consider that party when apportioning fault [W]here one codefendant 
moves for summary judgment against the plaintiff on the basis that it bears 
no liability - any other defendant must file an apportionment cross-claim in 
order to have standing to oppose the other codefendant's 
motion [because] the Act prohibits such an apportionment claim from 
being brought outside the underlying tort action, the apportionment claim 
must be brought - if at all - as a cross-claim in the underlying su i t . . . . 
Norton. 937 P.2d at 556 n.2. 
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These cases thus required defendants to do nothing more than they did - follow 
the plain language of the Act and ask the District Court to instruct the jury to apportion 
fault among all plaintiffs and all defendants. After defendants made their request, the 
statute required the court to direct the jury to apportion fault among defendants and all 
plaintiffs. The District Court was wrong to do otherwise. 
Third, plaintiffs miss the point of defendants' reference to the 1999 amendments 
to the Act. It should be emphasized that defendants' comparative fault arguments are not 
dependent on whether the 1999 amendments apply retroactively to this case. Therefore, 
this Court need not reach the retroactivity issue to reverse the District Court's judgment. 
As explained in their opening brief, defendants point to the 1999 amendments principally 
to provide further evidence of the Legislature's long-standing intent that no defendant be 
held liable for more that its proportionate share of fault. Defs.' Br. at 64-65. As this 
Court made clear in Field v. Bover Co.. 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998), the Act requires the 
trial court, when requested, to direct the jury to allocate fault to "three classes of persons 
- plaintiffs, defendants, and immune persons " IcL at 1081. Because defendants 
indisputably made such a request, the District Court was wrong to prevent the jury from 
allocating fault to all plaintiffs as required by the Act, regardless whether the 1999 
amendments apply retroactively or not. 
This Court would have to consider the application of the 1999 amendments to this 
case only if the Court were to conclude, contrary to the record, that plaintiffs were 
somehow transformed into "nonparties" at the end of trial. As defendants explained in 
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their opening brief, the 1999 amendments clarified that the Act has always required fault 
to be allocated to whomever may be responsible for a plaintiffs injuries, even nonparties. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39(1). Contrary to plaintiffs' claims, this was the law even 
at the time of trial. See Floor Debate, Utah Judiciary Comm., Jan. 29, 1999 (noting that 
the portion of the holding in Field that fault should not be attributed to nonparties, was 
"contrary to the intent of the principle of comparative faul t . . . . [Field] changed some of 
the practice before that decision so we are trying to correct that by clarifying that 
defendant means any person, that even if they can't be located, can be proved has 
something to do with [the claimed negligence].. .the changes that we 're recommending 
will place us back in pretty much the position we thought we were in before this recent 
Supreme Court case") (statement of Rep. Swallow) (emphasis added). 
The Legislature expressly made the 1999 amendments retroactive to March 3, 
1998 for any actions for which "a final unappealable judgment or order has not been 
issued" as of the amendments' effective date, May 3, 1999. 1999 Utah Laws, ch. 95, § 6. 
Since this case is now pending before this Court, no "final unappealable judgment" has 
yet issued. Plaintiffs do not contend otherwise. Instead, plaintiffs argue that retroactive 
application of the amended Act to this case would "destroy plaintiffs' vested right in the 
existing jury verdict." Pis.' Br. at 63. While the amendments do provide that courts 
should not apply them retroactively if they would "destroy a vested right," see 1999 Utah 
Laws, ch. 95, § 6, the legislative history to the amendments shows that plaintiffs never 
had any "vested right" to exclude nonparties from the apportionment process, see Defs.' 
Br. at 63-65. Where, as here, an amendment only confirms and clarifies how the law 
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should have been understood at the time of trial, the amendment "will be given 
retroactive effect." Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 953 
P.2d 435, 440 (Utah 1997).8 Therefore, if this Court determines that plaintiffs were 
nonparties, it should apply the 1999 amendments of the Act to this case and reverse. 
In sum, the guiding theme of the Act has remained unchanged since its enactment 
in 1986: The "maximum amount for which a defendant may be liable to any person 
seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant." Utah Code. Ann. § 78-27-
40(1); see also, e ^ , Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) ("Clearly, [the Act] mandate[s] that a trial court cannot apportion more fault to a 
defendant than that amount of fault attributable to that defendant, even if he or she 
refuses to bring other potentially liable defendants into the lawsuit."). By refusing to 
instruct the jury to apportion fault among all plaintiffs and defendants, the District Court 
improperly allowed the jury to attribute to defendants more than their fair share of fault 
for plaintiffs' claimed injuries. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987), is therefore 
misplaced. In Stephens, the issue before the Court was whether the 1986 amendments to 
the Act should apply retroactively when the amendments were silent on this point. 741 
P.2d at 953. The jury had returned a verdict finding one defendant 25% liable and 
another defendant 75% liable. Since joint and several liability existed in Utah at the time 
of the tort (1984), the trial court permitted plaintiff to collect the entire judgment from the 
defendant who was found to be 25% at fault. Id. Because the 1986 amendments replaced 
joint and several liability with a comparative fault scheme, the Stephens court held that 
the amendments changed the "substantive law" in effect at the time of the tort and thus 
concluded that the 1986 amendments would not apply retroactively. Id. Here, the 
amendments to the comparative fault statute did not change the substantive law, but 
merely clarified what the Legislature always intended the law to be. 
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B. Defendants Never "Waived" Their Right To Have The Jury Allocate 
Fault To All Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs make the equally unsupportable claim that defendants somehow 
"waived" their statutory right to a proper consideration and apportionment of fault among 
all plaintiffs and defendants. Pis.5 Br. at 63-65. Plaintiffs can make this assertion only by 
ignoring the standard of review and by closing their eyes to the mountain of evidence 
demonstrating that: (1) plaintiffs were partners in the Channel 13 venture; (2) many 
plaintiffs acted as agents for their fellow plaintiffs; and (3) plaintiffs were involved 
intimately in the key decisions that led to Channel 13's decline. See Defs.' Br. at 56-60. 
First, plaintiffs' "waiver" argument ignores basic partnership law. As this Court 
has held, "[p]artners obviously occupy a fiduciary relationship and must deal with each 
other in the utmost good faith." Burke v. Farrell. 656 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1982). 
Therefore, by definition, plaintiffs who were partners in the Channel 13 venture owed 
fiduciary duties to their fellow partners. 
Second, because the District Court effectively directed a verdict in plaintiffs' favor 
when it refused to allow the jury to apportion fault among defendants and all plaintiffs, 
this Court must review the evidence demonstrating plaintiffs' fault for each others' 
damages in the light most favorable to defendants. See, e.g., Pavoni v. Nielsen, 2000 UT 
App. 74, \ 14, 999 P.2d 595, 596. That evidence, which plaintiffs conveniently ignore in 
their brief, shows that plaintiff David Lee (a lawyer) played a pivotal role in the Channel 
13 venture, provided legal advice during critical periods to his father Joseph Lee, and 
acted as his father's agent and lawyer on virtually every Channel 13 matter. See, e.g.. 
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R.26144 at 40-41. Plaintiff Brent Pratt, by his own admission, represented plaintiff 
Sidney Foulger's interests in Channel 13. Plaintiff Sidney Foulger also admitted that co-
plaintiffs Brent Pratt and Clayton Foulger acted as his agents and advised him regarding 
the Channel 13 venture. See R.27111 at 14. 
Defendants also established at trial that Sidney Foulger refused to make available 
$2.6 million in financing he previously had agreed to provide Channel 13. R.25158 at 
146-148, 153-154. As plaintiffs testified, Sidney Foulger's unexpected default left MWT 
Ltd. in a precarious situation and without funds required to purchase the necessary 
equipment and programming to put a new station on the air. R.21883 at 28; R.24600 at 
149-51.9 The jury, therefore, had more than sufficient evidence to determine whether, for 
example: the actions of Brent Pratt caused Sidney Foulger's damages; the legal advice 
David Lee gave his father Joe Lee resulted in plaintiffs' harm; and/or Sidney Foulger's 
default on his commitment to provide $2.6 million caused the station to fail and injured 
his co-partners (plaintiffs Joseph Lee, Jo-Ann Kilpatrick and George Gonzales). 
Plaintiffs assert, without any citation to the record, that the District Court made a 
determination that this abundant evidence of the fault of co-plaintiffs for the harms that 
9
 Plaintiffs maintain repeatedly and erroneously that plaintiff Sidney Foulger did not 
default on an obligation to provide $2.6 million in financing to Channel 13, but merely 
declined to exercise an "option" to make such a contribution. See Pis.' Br. App. at 10, 
12, 13. Tellingly, plaintiffs avoid citing the language of the actual document signed by 
Sidney Foulger. That agreement makes it clear that he had a contractual obligation to 
loan MWT Ltd. $2.6 million; the document makes no reference to a purported "option" to 
provide funding. See R.31110 (DX 112) ("Northstar and Foulger agree.. . to make 
loans to the Partnership.... The loan by Foulger shall be in the aggregate principal 
amount of $2,600,000.") (emphasis added). 
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each recovering plaintiff suffered was somehow insufficient to support a comparative 
fault instruction. See Pis.' Br. at 64-65. But this is yet another fiction. The District 
Court recognized that a comparative fault instruction was necessary in this case, and it 
gave a comparative fault instruction. What the District Court did not do was allow the 
jury to apportion fault among all plaintiffs and all defendants. See R.20429-20443. 
Plaintiffs' attempt to convince this Court that the District Court found that there was 
insufficient evidence to support a proper comparative fault instruction is plain wrong.10 
To affirm the District Court's refusal to allow the jury to apportion fault to all 
plaintiffs, this Court would need to conclude that "reasonable minds would agree that no 
substantial evidence" supported having the jury (as required by Utah's comparative fault 
statute) apportion fault among all plaintiffs. Pavoni. 2000 UT App. 74, % 14, 999 P.2d at 
598 (internal quote and citation omitted) (emphasis added). In view of the overwhelming 
evidence that several, if not all, co-plaintiffs were at least partially responsible for the 
damages that each recovering plaintiff suffered, this Court cannot draw such a 
conclusion. See, e.g.. Nay. 850 P.2d at 1263 (directed verdict justified only if examining 
all of the evidence "in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party," there is no 
Plaintiffs also cannot credibly argue that it was a mystery to them until the charge 
conference that defendants would ask the jury to consider the fault of all plaintiffs. See 
Pis.' Br. at 65. Defendants were put on notice at the very beginning of this case that 
defendants would argue that plaintiffs were themselves responsible for a portion of their 
alleged damages. See R.13161-13177 (Defendants' Answer at ^65) ("Plaintiffs' 
damages, if any, must be reduced b y . . . breach of duty, acts or omissions, contributory 
negligence, assumption of the risk or fault of or attributable to the plaintiffs."). Plaintiffs 
certainly never were "deprived" of the "opportunity to meet defendants' claim of fault 
comparison." Pis.' Br. at 65. 
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competent evidence that would support a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor). It 
therefore was reversible error for the District Court to refuse to instruct the jury that it 
must consider the fault of all plaintiffs when allocating liability. See, e.g.. Zieber v. 
Bogert, 747 A.2d 905, 908-09 (Pa. Super. 2000) ("Because even minimal evidence of 
comparative negligence requires a charge on the issue when requested, and Appellants 
had requested such an instruction, we hold that the trial court should have given an 
appropriate jury instruction on comparative negligence and that its failure to do so is 
reversible error."), appeal denied. 2000 Pa. LEXIS 2173 (Pa. Aug. 31, 2000). 
C. Defendants Submitted Proper Comparative Fault Jury Instructions. 
In a final effort to justify the District Court's error, plaintiffs argue that the special 
verdict forms and jury instructions defendants proposed were inaccurate, and that the 
District Court therefore properly excluded the jury from considering the fault of all 
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are wrong for three reasons. 
First, the District Court gave the jury a comparative fault instruction - it simply 
failed properly to tell the jury that it was required to allocate fault among all plaintiffs, 
not just an individual recovering plaintiff. See R.2043 6-20442. This is the sole error in 
the court's comparative fault charge that defendants challenge on this appeal. Plaintiffs' 
effort to raise claimed technical errors in proposed instructions on other aspects of 
comparative fault (such as any alleged error in the definition of "fault" in defendants' 
proposed instructions, see Pis.' Br. at 67) is, therefore, a transparent effort to deflect this 
Court from the only error that is the focus of this appeal. 
26 
Second, the forms and instructions defendants submitted accurately stated the law 
and properly requested the jury to apportion fault among all plaintiffs and defendants. 
Compare R. 19166-19170 (proposed special verdict form for plaintiff Joseph Lee) 
(directing jury to assign fault to Joseph Lee, to the defendants, and to the other plaintiffs 
if the jury "find[s] that one or more of the other plaintiffs acted or failed to act in a 
manner so as to contribute to the damages that you awarded Joseph Lee"), with Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-39(1) (trial court "shall" direct the jury to determine "the percentage 
or proportion of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and 
to any other person whether joined as a party to the action or not"). Defendants' 
proposed jury instruction similarly was proper and conformed to the language of the Act. 
Compare R.19991-19994 (Proposed Jury Instr. No. 45) ("[I]f, in addition to any liable 
defendant, one or more plaintiffs acted or failed to act in a manner that contributed to the 
plaintiffs' claimed injury and damages, the fault of each of those plaintiffs and each liable 
defendant must be considered and assigned a percentage of the total fault. . . ."), with 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-38 through 78-27-40. 
Third, even if there were any technical defects in these proposed instructions - and 
there were not - it would still be error to refuse to give a comparative fault instruction 
where the "requests sufficed to alert the district court to the need for some instructions, 
even if not the specific ones urged by the defendants, on the affirmative defense[] of 
comparative negligence." Wilson v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 150 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 
1998); see also Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co.. 663 F.2d 598, 603 (5th Cir. Dec. 1981) 
(same). This is a standard that defendants' proposed instructions satisfied. 
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Defendants submitted correct jury instructions and special verdict forms, and the 
District Court never ruled otherwise. Moreover, any imperfections in the proposed 
instructions that plaintiffs now conjure up cannot possibly serve as a basis for supporting 
the District Court's erroneous refusal to direct the jury to apportion fault among all 
plaintiffs and all defendants, as required by the Act. Plaintiffs rightly do not dispute that 
if the District Court erred - as it surely did - in failing to follow the Act's requirements, 
defendants are entitled to a new trial on all issues. Compare Defs.' Br. at 60, 68, with 
Pis.' Br. at 56-65. Therefore, this Court should reverse the judgment and order a new 
trial on both liability and damages. 
III. The District Court Did Not Instruct The Jury On Defendants' Affirmative 
Defenses Of Waiver And Estoppel And Its Failure To Do So Was Error. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that waiver and estoppel are recognized defenses to claims 
of legal malpractice. See id at 70-76. Plaintiffs also do not dispute that the factual 
record below fiilly supports the defenses of waiver and estoppel, and that the District 
Court refused to provide instructions on these defenses (thereby essentially directing a 
verdict in plaintiffs' favor on two of defendants' central defenses). See id. This should 
end the inquiry because "[a] party is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted to 
the jury, and where there is evidence to support a party's theory of the case, it is error for 
the court to refuse to instruct thereon." Goode v. Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738 P.2d 638, 
640 (Utah 1987); see also Rodgers v. Withers. 593 N.E.2d 669, 673 (111. App. Ct. 1992) 
("[A]n instruction which omits reference to a defendant's affirmative defense is 
reversible error."). 
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Rather than accept the District Court's error, plaintiffs instead attempt to 
rationalize the court's refusal to give any instruction on the affirmative defenses of 
waiver and estoppel, by claiming that "the concepts of waiver and estoppel were given in 
substance" and by raising, once again, hyper-technical - and incorrect - arguments that 
defendants' proposed instructions were somehow improper. See Pis.5 Br. at 70-71. 
Neither argument has any merit. 
First, as they did below, plaintiffs persist in confusing the concept of informed 
consent with the affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel. See Pis.' Br. at 75-76. 
Plaintiffs point the Court to certain of the District Court's instructions discussing the 
requirements for plaintiffs to have given their informed consent to Wiley Rein's 
representation of Northstar. Plaintiffs then claim that these instructions, in substance, 
instructed the jury on the defenses of waiver and estoppel because they supposedly focus 
on the "client's conduct" after he or she becomes aware of a conflict. See id. at 75. 
However, plaintiffs fail to inform the Court that the District Court instructed the jury that 
informed consent principally focuses on the attorney's conduct and whether the lawyer 
adequately informed the client of the conflict. See, e.g.. R.20402 (Jury Inst. No. 55) ("A 
client cannot waive the right to object to simultaneous adverse representation where full 
disclosure of the effects of the adverse representation is not made."); R.20388 (Jury Inst. 
No. 41) ("A lawyer representing one client may represent another client with conflicting 
interests if both clients give their informed consent after full disclosure by the attorney of 
all the facts, legal implications, possible effects and other circumstances relating to the 
proposed multiple representation "). 
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Therefore, the jury instructions, 'taken as a whole," see Pis.' Br. at 71, 74-75, told 
the jury that a client can give informed consent to a conflict of interest only if he or she 
was advised adequately of the conflict and the ramifications of consenting to it. What the 
District Court did not tell the jury is that regardless of whether plaintiffs gave their 
"informed consent" to the conflict at the outset, plaintiffs' legal malpractice claims could 
still be barred if plaintiffs did not object to the conflict, and take other appropriate action, 
once they became aware of it. This is the essence of the affirmative defenses of waiver 
and estoppel. Yet, this concept is found nowhere in the court's instructions. In short, 
instructions on informed consent do not suffice to charge a jury on waiver and estoppel. 
Second, plaintiffs similarly miss the mark in arguing that defendants' proposed 
jury instruction on waiver and estoppel was erroneous. The District Court never held or 
even suggested that defendants' proposed waiver and estoppel instruction was worded 
improperly. Rather, the court mistakenly believed that its informed consent instructions 
were appropriate substitutes for instructions on waiver and estoppel. See R.21219-21231 
(Aug. 13, 1999 Mem. Decision at 6). 
In any event, defendants' proposed instructions were correct. Plaintiffs' claim that 
the proposed waiver instruction was defective because it did not inform the jury that 
"adequate or full disclosure" is a condition of "waiver," Pis.' Br. at 72-73, again 
confuses informed consent with waiver of a legal malpractice claim. An instruction on 
waiver would never include any reference to an attorney's disclosure because waiver, 
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unlike informed consent, principally focuses on the client's conduct after the conflict 
comes to light. See Defs.' Br. at 71 . n 
Plaintiffs also argue that defendants' proposed waiver instruction failed adequately 
to state the test for waiver (in particular, the intent element of waiver) as set forth in 
Geisdorf v. Doughty. 972 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998). See Pis.' Br. at 73. But plaintiffs are 
wrong. Consistent with Geisdorf, defendants' proposed instruction stated that waiver is 
an affirmative relinquishment of a known right. Compare Geisdorf, 972 P.2d at 72 
("[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right."), with R.19453-19455 
(Proposed Jury Inst. No. 26) ("Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known 
right."). Plaintiffs also criticize defendants' proposed instruction for not stating that 
silence cannot constitute a waiver unless there is some "duty or obligation to speak." See 
Pis.' Br. at 73. However, defendants' proposed instruction explained that a failure to 
object to a known conflict is merely a "factor" to be considered in determining whether a 
party has waived a claim. See R.19453-19455. As this Court in Geisdorf noted, a waiver 
may be "implied" based on an assessment of the "totality of the circumstances," a 
holding that is consistent with defendants' proposed charge. See 972 P.2d at 72. 
In support of this argument, plaintiffs cite their trial expert for the proposition that the 
affirmative defense of waiver "must be based on full disclosure and knowledge of the 
consequences." Pis.' Br. at 72. However, the passage from Mallen's treatise that 
plaintiffs cite discusses the defense of ratification, not waiver. The complete sentence 
from the treatise reads as follows: "In contrast to assuming liability to a third person, 
however, ratification, when applied in favor of an attorney, must involve more than mere 
consent or approval of the attorney's action; it must be based on full disclosure and 
knowledge of the consequences." 2 Mallen, Legal Malpractice § 20.11, at 701. 
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Defendants' proposed estoppel instruction was also correct. Compare Clarke v. 
American Concept Ins. Co.. 758 P.2d 470, 473-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ('The elements 
of estoppel are: conduct by one party which leads another party, in reliance thereon, to 
adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is permitted to 
repudiate his conduct.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), with R. 19453-
19455 (Proposed Jury Inst. No. 26) ("Estoppel occurs when a party acts in a manner so as 
to cause another party acting in reasonable reliance to alter its position to its harm."). 
Plaintiffs incorrectly cite Utah County v. Young. 615 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Utah 1980) for 
the proposition that "silence or inaction" can never "operate to work an estoppel." Pis.' 
Br. at 74. However, as this Court has held, the essential elements of estoppel include "a 
statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later 
asserted." CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists. Inc.. 772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989) 
(emphasis added). Moreover, defendants' instructions properly focused on plaintiffs' 
"conduct" and "acts," not their silence. 
Finally, any technical errors in defendants' proposed waiver and estoppel 
instruction would not permit the District Court to refuse to provide any instruction on the 
defenses of waiver and estoppel and in effect grant plaintiffs a directed verdict on two of 
defendants' affirmative defenses that the record supported. See, e.g.. Harville. 663 F.2d 
at 603 ("Even if a requested instruction is not correct in every respect, it may impose 
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upon the court a duty to submit a more specific instruction where such instruction is 
necessary for the defendant's affirmative defense.").12 
There can be no question that the factual record fully supported both of 
defendants' affirmative defenses. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. See Clarke, 758 P.2d at 473-74. The record shows the following: (1) plaintiffs 
were aware for years that Wiley Rein represented Northstar; (2) plaintiffs were 
independently represented by Ralph Hardy and his firm in all matters where Northstar 
was adverse to plaintiffs; and (3) plaintiffs never once objected to Wiley Rein's 
representation of Northstar during the four year period from 1987-1991 when plaintiffs 
assert defendants were breaching duties to plaintiffs by representing Northstar. See 
Defs.' Br. at 69-72.13 Plaintiffs' repeated failure to object to Wiley Rein's representation 
12
 Plaintiffs' reliance on Pacific Chromalox Div. v. Irev. 787 P.2d 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); Black v. McKnight 562 P.2d 621 (Utah 1977); Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.. 144 
F.3d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Moonev v. Aramco Servs. Co.. 54 F.3d 1207 (5th Cir. 1995); 
AMERCO v. Shoen. 907 P.2d 536 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); State ex rel. State Highwav 
Dept. v. Strosnider. 747 P.2d 254 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); and St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. 
Salovich. 705 P.2d 812 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985), is therefore inappropriate. None of these 
cases holds that a court can refuse to provide any instruction on an affirmative defense 
that is legally viable and supported by the evidence merely because a party submits a 
technically imperfect instruction. In fact, many of these cases support defendants' 
position that a trial court must instruct on defenses supported by the evidence. See, e.g.. 
Pacific Chromalox, 787 P.2d at 1328 ("It is the trial court's duty to cover both parties' 
theories and points of law in giving jury instructions, provided there is competent 
evidence to support them."); Black. 562 P.2d at 622 (same). 
Because the District Court essentially directed a verdict in plaintiffs' favor by refusing 
to instruct on the defenses of waiver and estoppel, defendants are entitled to all favorable 
inferences that can be drawn from the record. See, e.g.. Pavoni. 2000 UT App. 74, 999 
P.2d595. 
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of Northstar at a time when they were admittedly represented by Ralph Hardy, satisfies 
the requirements of a waiver defense. 
The evidence also supported an estoppel defense. As explained in Eldredge v. 
Utah State Ret. Bd.. 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), estoppel is a defense based 
on a "failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted." Plaintiffs' 
claim that Wiley Rein represented them and breached fiduciary duties owed plaintiffs 
from 1987 through 1991 was flatly inconsistent with the undisputed facts that they 
retained, and relied on, Ralph Hardy to represent them during this time and never 
objected to Wiley Rein's representation of Northstar during that period. Wiley Rein 
properly relied on plaintiffs' retention of Hardy as well as plaintiffs' conspicuous failure 
to object to Wiley Rein's representation of Northstar. Properly instructed, the jury, 
therefore, could have found that plaintiffs' conduct during this period estopped them 
from asserting that Wiley Rein owed them, or breached, any fiduciary duties. 
Plaintiffs quote Tingev v. Christensen. 1999 UT 68, 987 P.2d 588, for the 
proposition that this Court will reverse a district court's refusal to give a proffered jury 
instruction only when "there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would 
have been a result more favorable to the complaining party." Pis.' Br. at 76. As the 
foregoing evidence shows, defendants were in fact deprived of a more favorable result 
because the jury was prevented from accepting their defenses of waiver and estoppel. 
Furthermore, a decision not to instruct the jury on a party's theory is always error when 
that decision prevents a party from "argujmg] its theory of the case" to the jury. Id.; see 
Rodgers, 593 N.E.2d at 673 (reversible error to omit reference to defendant's affirmative 
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defense). Because the District Court's instructions did not enable defendants to argue 
their affirmative defenses to the jury, any "confidence in the jury's verdict is 
undermined." Tingev, 1999 UT 68, f 16, 987 P.2d at 592. The verdict should therefore 
be reversed. 
IV, Plaintiffs Confirm That The Jury's Liability Determination Is Fatally Flawed 
Because The District Court Allowed The Jury To Do Exactly What This 
Court Said It Cannot Do - Speculate About The Disclosure Of Confidential 
Information. 
In an effort to support the District Court's decision to send their breach of 
confidentiality claim to the jury, plaintiffs ignore entirely a recent decision of this Court 
(cited in defendants' opening brief) holding that a breach of fiduciary duty claim cannot 
be founded on speculation that confidential information "must have been disclosed" by 
the defendant. See Gildea. 970 P.2d at 1270. This Court is not alone. Courts throughout 
the country hold that to find a breach of the duty of confidentiality there must be evidence 
that defendants not only received confidential information, but that they actually misused 
or disclosed such information. See, e.g.. Lazy Seven Coal Sales. Inc. v. Stone & Hinds. 
P.C.. 813 S.W.2d 400, 409-10 (Tenn. 1991); Wilboum v. Stennett. Wilkinson & Ward. 
687 So. 2d 1205, 1217 (Miss. 1996). Plaintiffs' own trial experts confirmed this 
requirement for a breach of confidentiality claim. See 2 Mallen, Legal Malpractice 
§ 14.5, at 244; R.26954 at 5-6 (Prof. Morris) (agreeing that in order for there to be a 
breach of confidentiality, a lawyer must "actually misuse or make unauthorized 
disclosures" of confidential information). As they do with Gildea, plaintiffs simply 
ignore this abundant authority in an effort to salvage an unsustainable verdict. 
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The reason plaintiffs are hiding from Gildea and this other authority is apparent -
plaintiffs are unable to cite any evidence that defendants actually disclosed or misused 
any confidential information. Instead, as they did at trial, plaintiffs support their breach 
of confidentiality claim with nothing more than unsubstantiated speculation that 
defendants "must have" disclosed or misused confidential information in representing 
Northstar. See Pis.5 Br. at 77-80. Thus, plaintiffs argue that defendants (in particular 
Wood) "must have" divulged confidential information to Northstar because Northstar 
was able to take advantage of plaintiffs during the November 1986 meetings and force 
them to enter into an unfavorable business relationship. See Pis.' Br. at 78. 
This is exactly the type of speculation that Gildea held was insufficient to support 
a breach of confidentiality claim. As this Court held: "without any evidence that 
[defendant] communicated confidential information, such a conclusion [that defendant 
must have disclosed confidential information] is pure speculation and conjecture which 
cannot be allowed to form the basis of a jury's verdict." 970 P.2d at 1270. See also Park 
v.Georgia Gulf Corp., No. 91-569,1992 WL 714968, at *5 (D. Del. Sept. 14, 1992) (fact 
that employee who disclosed information given in confidence to executive was 
terminated immediately after executive spoke with employee's manager not sufficient to 
prove that executive disclosed confidential information to the manager; there "[was] not a 
sufficient factual basis to support an inference that those two events were causally 
connected"); Quad County Distrib. v. Burroughs Corp.. 385 N.E. 2d 1108,1111 (111. App. 
Ct. 1979) (judgment based on alleged breach of confidentiality reversed where there was 
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no specific act linking third party's access to information with a breach and only basis for 
concluding that the information was divulged was "assumption and supposition"). 
Moreover, plaintiffs overlook the unequivocal testimony at trial that defendants 
never disclosed or misused any confidential information, and fail to deal with the 
testimony of their own trial experts who agreed, based upon their review of the record, 
that there was no evidence of actual misuse or disclosure of confidential information by 
defendants. Defs.' Br. at 74-75. Although a jury is permitted to draw reasonable 
inferences from the evidence, a jury may not base its verdict on pure speculation, 
particularly when, as here, such speculation flies in the face of the record. See Walter v. 
Holiday Inns, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 1159,1179-80 (D.N.J. 1992) ("[P]laintiffs cannot rest on 
the hope that the jury will not believe the record evidence and therefore spin a web of 
under-handedness which entangles the defendants There must be some affirmative 
evidence that the event occurred.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).14 
Therefore, as set forth in their opening brief, defendants are entitled to judgment on 
plaintiffs' breach of the duty of confidentiality claim and a new trial on all remaining 
issues. See Defs.' Br. at 76. 
Plaintiffs repeat their mantra that defendants failed to marshal the evidence supporting 
the jury's verdict. Pis.' Br. at 77. But plaintiffs are wrong. Defendants did address in 
their opening brief the speculative "evidence" of misuse that plaintiffs cite. See Defs.' 
Br. at 75. Furthermore, defendants detailed the evidence that demonstrates defendants 
never misused or disclosed any confidential information. See id. at 73-76. 
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V. The District Court Made Several Erroneous Rulings On Damages That 
Resulted In An Unsustainable Damage Award. 
A. The District Court Should Have Directed The Jury To Measure 
Damages From The Date Of Breach, Not Years After The Alleged 
Injury Occurred. 
Plaintiffs admit that the jury awarded them damages measured as of the date of 
trial (based on their expert's 1997 damage calculations), not as of the date of any claimed 
breach. See Pis.' Br. at 89 (jury awarded "lost profits from 1987 to the date of trial and 
the [market] value of Channel 13 as of the date of trial") (emphasis added). This 
admission makes clear that the jury's lost ownership damage award cannot stand because, 
as cases in Utah and throughout the country hold, the jury must measure damages as of 
the date of the breach - not years later when the case is tried. See Defs.' Br. at 78-80.15 
Plaintiffs' argument in support of the District Court's decision to allow the jury to 
measure plaintiffs' damages as of the date of trial, rather than as of the date of breach, 
boils down to a single flawed proposition: plaintiffs assert that awarding them damages as 
of the date of the breach would somehow "under-compensate" them. See Pis.' Br. at 85, 
89. This argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal rules governing 
Issues relating to the proper measure of damages present questions of law when there is 
a "rule or principle" governing the measure of damages that can be "uniformly applied." 
Lvsenko v. Sawava. 2000 UT 58, 7 P.3d 783, 787. There is such a "rule or principle" 
that can be "uniformly applied" in this case (and in all similar cases) - damages are to be 
measured from the date of the breach. See Defs.' Br. at 78; see also General Auto Parts 
Co. v. Genuine Parts Co.. 979 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Idaho 1999) (measure of damages is a 
question of law reviewed de novo). Plaintiffs therefore are wrong to claim that the 
standard of review on this issue is abuse of discretion. See Pis.' Br. at 83. 
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the recovery of damages, which, if accepted, would radically alter the way damages are 
awarded throughout this State. 
To begin with, even plaintiffs' own damage expert rejects their false cry of under-
compensation. Mr. Schutz offered two damage estimates: one as of 1987 and another 
(discussed below) as of the expected date of trial in 1997. Mr. Schutz testified that his 
estimate of the fair market value of Channel 13 (i.e., lost ownership damages) as of 1987, 
shortly after the FCC awarded MWT Ltd. the Channel 13 license, would account fully for 
both the going concern value of Channel 13 at the time of defendants' alleged breach plus 
future profits the station might have earned for ten years thereafter, discounted to present 
value. See R.26677 at 45-52; see also R.29534 (PX 293). It is difficult to understand how 
such an award could possibly under-compensate plaintiffs. 
Courts in Utah confirm that measuring market value damages as of the date of an 
alleged breach ensures that a plaintiff is fully compensated for all damages proximately 
caused by that breach. See, e.g.. Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins. Brown & Gunnell. Inc.. 
784 P.2d 475, 480 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding that because liability attaches "at the 
time of the loss," an appraisal done shortly after a breach "is more relevant to the actual 
loss incurred" than measuring damages years later at the time of trial) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). This long-standing rule for measuring damages is followed 
throughout the country. For example, in Sharma v. Skaarup Ship Mgmt. Corp.. 916 F.2d 
820, 826 (2d Cir. 1990), a case discussed in defendants' opening brief but which plaintiffs 
do not even cite, the Second Circuit explained: "Measuring . . . damages by the value of 
the item at the time of the breach is eminently sensible and actually takes expected lost 
future profits into account The [market] value of assets . . . is the discounted value of 
the stream of future income that the assets are expected to produce. This stream of 
income, of course, includes expected future profits and/or capital appreciation." Id. at 826 
(emphasis added). 
The reasons for this uniform rule are quite sensible, which is undoubtedly why 
plaintiffs never bother to discuss the rule's rationale. If the time of trial, as opposed to the 
date of breach, governed the date for measuring damages, 'the rule would be a two-edged 
sword, because courts would have to diminish damage awards where the value of the item 
decreased or where losses were encountered subsequent to the breach as well as enhance 
them where conditions improve." Id.; see also Price-Orem. 784 P.2d at 480 ("[Defendant 
cannot take advantage of events occurring after harm has occurred and liability has 
attached to reduce the damages for that harm.") (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Allowing the court's docket to control the date for measuring damages would 
mean that a plaintiffs recovery would never be tied to the damages the plaintiff actually 
suffered at the time of breach; instead, the amount of plaintiff s recovery would ebb and 
flow based on the court's docket and market conditions from the date of breach until the 
date of trial. 
Far from rebutting defendants' arguments, the authorities plaintiffs cite support the 
rule that damages should be measured as of the date of the breach, not the time of trial. 
For example, in Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the 
court held that the measure of damages for conversion "is the value of the property at the 
time of conversion, plus interest." Id. at 468 (internal quote and citation omitted); see 
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also Fairway Builders, Inc. v. Malouf Towers Rental Co.. 603 P.2d 513, 525-526 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1979) (acknowledging that "the general rule appears to be that the rights of the 
parties with respect to a breach of contract are fixed at the time of breach and that 
damages are measured as of that time").16 
Other cases plaintiffs cite are simply inapposite. For example, in Alexander v. 
Brown. 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 1982), this Court held that when a party breached a 1973 
contract to pave a road and install a curb, gutter and sidewalk, plaintiffs were entitled to 
"benefit of the bargain" damages in 1980 (the date of the trial) that were calculated by 
looking at the 1976 costs incurred by plaintiffs' neighbor for similar road improvements 
and estimating how much it would cost plaintiff to have the bargained for improvements 
made. Id at 695. In Alexander, the plaintiffs could only be made whole by receiving 
sufficient money at the time of trial so they could then pay for the road improvements for 
which they bargained. Here, plaintiffs would have been made whole by measuring 
damages as of the date of the breach, because such damages would have awarded 
plaintiffs the value of Channel 13 as of the time of the breach, including ten years of 
future profits.17 
16
 The Fairway Builders court upheld an award of damages for repair of an improperly 
installed surface to the exterior of a building that was calculated as of the trial date 
because "the extent of the breach (requiring the entire removal of the marblecrete) was 
not ascertainable until two years after its installation and shortly before the trial." 603 
P.2d at 527. Therefore, the date of trial and the date when the extent of the breach fiilly 
manifested were virtually identical. This is not so here. The date of trial was eight years 
after the latest conceivable breach (i.e., the 1990 sale of Channel 13 to Fox). 
17
 InreEstateofRothko. 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977), is also distinguishable. There, the 
court affirmed an award based on the appreciated value of paintings sold in violation of 
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By impermissibly allowing the jury to award damages measured as of the date of 
trial, the District Court allowed the jury to over-compensate plaintiffs in violation of the 
basic rule of awarding damages only for actual losses sustained. The over-compensation 
is obvious: Mr. Schutz's 1987 estimate of lost ownership damages (which included a 
projection of lost profits from 1987 to 1997) was $10 million; yet, the jury awarded 
plaintiffs more than $23 million. The only way to correct this error is by granting a new 
trial. And because the jury's damage calculation is inextricably linked to the date when 
any breach occurred, the new trial must include both liability and damages. See 
Mikkelsen v. Haslam. 764 P.2d 1384,1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
For similar reasons, plaintiffs are also wrong when they assert that the jury was 
entitled to award them both lost cash distributions from the date of breach until the date 
of trial plus lost ownership damages as of the date of trial. There is no basis for 
permitting such double recovery. As plaintiffs' damage expert confirmed, plaintiffs 
cannot recover lost ownership damages as of the date of any breach plus future cash 
distributions, because the lost ownership damages already include lost future profits. 
an injunction and restraining order when the executors had a duty to abide by these orders 
and retain the paintings. The New York court did not address the issue of the 
appropriateness of measuring damages from the date of the breach when, as here, doing 
so would fully compensate plaintiffs for all damages flowing from the alleged breach. 
Similarly, Rea v. Ford Motor Co.. 560 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1977), and the string of cases 
that plaintiffs cite in footnote 26, see Pis.' Br. at 88, also do not support deviating from 
the rule that damages should be measured from the date of the breach. These decisions 
consider issues related to the award of non-speculative lost profits for a reasonable time 
after the breach. That is just what Mr. Schutz's 1987 estimate did. These decisions, 
therefore, support defendants' argument that damages must be calculated from the date of 
the breach, not the date of the trial. 
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R.22155 at 16 ("Q. You can't have both, can you? A. That is correct."). In the end, even 
plaintiffs are forced to concede as much. For they implicitly acknowledge, quite 
correctly, that if damages were properly measured as of the date of the breach, it would 
constitute an impermissible double recovery for the jury to award both lost ownership 
damages as of the date of the breach plus future cash distributions after that date. See 
Pis.' Br. at 90 ("Lost future profits [beyond 1998] would at least arguably duplicate the 
award based on the 1998 value of Channel 13 because the 1998 station value would be 
based on projected future profits."). Therefore, in reversing the judgment, this Court 
should vacate the jury's $6.4 million award of cash distributions damages because that 
award gives plaintiffs recovery for the same lost profits that are included in a fair market 
value of Channel 13 as of the date of breach. See Defs.' Br. at 80-82; see also Protectors 
Ins. Serv.. Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.. 132 F.3d 612, 615-17 (10th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff 
may not recover both lost ownership value, when future earnings are considered in 
arriving at that value, and future profits as this would constitute a double recovery). 
B. The Damage Award Is Impermissibly Based On Speculative Estimates. 
Plaintiffs had only one expert, Mr. Schutz, provide evidence of their damages as of 
1997, and, as plaintiffs concede, the jury awarded plaintiffs damages as of that date. See 
Pis.9 Br. at 89. Mr. Schutz5 s assessment of plaintiffs' lost ownership damages as of 1997 
consisted of hypothetical "revenue and cash flow projections for the station during the 
1987 to 1997 period" plus a fair market value estimate as of 1997 that was founded on 
"revenue and expense projections for channel 13 from 1997 onward for 10 years" until 
2007. R.0295 55-029564 (PX 295 at 2-3). Therefore, by awarding damages as of the date 
43 
of trial, as opposed to the date of breach, the jury awarded plaintiffs twenty years (1987-
2007) of hypothetical lost profits. See Pis.' Br. at 89, 91-92. It is only by relying on Mr. 
Schutz's speculative estimates of twenty years of hypothetical profits that any jury could 
award more than $23 million to the part owners of an untested television station that was 
on the verge of bankruptcy almost immediately after it went on the air - an award that 
ignores reality and represents a 23,000% return on plaintiffs5 $100,000 investment. See 
Defs.5 Br. at 6, 26-29 (citing record). 
In their scramble to defend an indefensible award, plaintiffs once again ignore 
well-established precedent in Utah and elsewhere holding that estimates of a new 
business' future success that are not based on prior or comparable operating experience 
are inherently speculative and, therefore, legally inadequate to support a lost profit award. 
See, e.g., Canvon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1989) (reversing 
award of damages for lost business based on 'theoretical" revenue figures); see also 
Defs.5 Br. at 86-90 (citing cases); R. Dunn, Recovery of Damages for Lost Profits § 7.14, 
at 557 (5th ed. 1998) (speculative damage evidence goes to admissibility and "[i]f expert 
testimony is improperly admitted at trial based on assumptions of fact not substantiated 
by the evidence, a judgment in favor of the party propounding the expert testimony 
should be reversed"). Plaintiffs also do not address the numerous cases requiring 
presentation of even more particularized evidence when valuing an entertainment venture 
like Channel 13, because of the uncertainties in predicting future profits in such a fickle 
industry. Id. at 88. Plaintiffs' silence speaks volumes; it only underscores that plaintiffs5 
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expert's speculative lost profit estimates fall far short of proving damages "with 
reasonable certainty." Canyon Country. 781 P.2d at 417.18 
Plaintiffs' explanation of what Mr. Schutz did to arrive at Channel 13's 
hypothetical revenue and expense figures only confirms the speculative and legally 
insufficient nature of his lost profit calculation and fair market value appraisals. In 
determining his revenue figures, plaintiffs concede that Mr. Schutz "estimated" Channel 
13's share of total advertising revenues for the Salt Lake City market to arrive at a gross 
income figure. See Pis.' Br. at 98. This revenue "estimate" was not based on any actual 
revenue figures of Channel 13 or any other comparable television station in Utah. It was 
simply a guess. R.22097 at 28-31. 
Mr. Schutz's "estimated direct costs" of operating Channel 13 (see Pis.' Br. at 98) 
were equally speculative; they were based on industry-wide data with no consideration of 
Channel 13's actual expenses or the actual operational costs of any other comparable 
television station in Utah or elsewhere. As Mr. Schutz candidly agreed when questioned 
by defendants' counsel: "Q [E]very single item of expense in every one of your 
Contrary to what plaintiffs want this Court to believe, damages cannot be based on 
pure conjecture. As the cases cited by plaintiffs hold, a plaintiff must still establish 
damages with reasonable certainty. See Pis.' Br. at 80-83 (citing decisions that confirm 
that damages must be proven with "reasonable certainty"). Plaintiffs also incorrectly 
characterize defendants' damage arguments, claiming that defendants are essentially 
challenging the denial of a remittitur motion and complaining about the admissibility of 
expert testimony. See id. at 92. Plaintiffs improperly transmute this issue in order to 
avoid facing the fact that the District Court committed a fundamental legal error when it 
permitted the jury to award damages based on the speculative estimates of Mr. Schutz. 
Finally, contrary to plaintiffs' claims, defendants marshal the evidence on this issue in 
their opening brief and demonstrate that, viewed in any light, the evidence was too 
speculative to support the damage award. See Defs.' Br. at 82-90. 
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studies simply represents your estimate of the amount of that item of expense for the 
period involved based on your judgment.. . . A. That is correct." R.22097 at 27. In 
summary, Mr. Schutz confirmed that all of his numbers are estimates for the Channel 13 
revenues and expenses. R.26389 at 62-63. Indeed, Mr. Schutz9 s own written damage 
appraisals contain the disclaimer that his estimates "are primarily intended for investment 
evaluation purposes only" and that they "should not be considered as either a direct or 
indirect prediction[] of what would actually occur." R.29534 (PX 293 at 3).19 
Recognizing that their expert's speculative estimates do not satisfy the reasonable 
certainty standard, plaintiffs ask this Court to uphold the jury's award on the basis of 
other "damage" evidence in this case, including appraisals and business plans by Frazier, 
Gross & Kadlec, Barry Wood, CPL and Northstar. See Pis.' Br. at 93-96. This Court 
should reject plaintiffs' invitation. Appraisals and business plans generated for the 
purpose of attracting investors are not sufficient to establish lost profits for a start-up 
venture. For example, affirming the trial court's ruling that plaintiffs proof of damages 
was too speculative, the Eighth Circuit in Mostly Media v. U.S. West Communications. 
186 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 1999), held that the parties' business plans could not be used to 
establish lost profits since these plans "were nothing more than optimistic projections for 
19
 Plaintiffs are wrong to claim that the appraisal approved by the court in Price-Orem. 
784 P.2d 475, and Mr. Schutz's appraisals are "very similar." Pis.' Br. at 100. Nothing 
is further from the truth. The rental revenue figures used in arriving at the appraised 
value in Price-Orem were based on the actual rents paid by other tenants in the shopping 
center in question and the rates paid by other tenants in comparable shopping centers in 
the surrounding Price-Orem area. 784 P.2d at 479. As demonstrated above, Mr. Schutz 
did not use any actual revenue and expense figures from Channel 13 or any other 
television station in Utah. 
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an enterprise that never got off the ground." Id. at 866. Similarly, in Schonfeld v. 
Hilliard. 62 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1076-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, 218 
F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2000), the district court rejected use of "business plans sent to 
investors" to establish lost profits, noting that the solicitation to invest in a start-up cable 
television channel "is as much an appeal to faith as to experience" and does not establish 
with any degree of certainty that the projected revenues would eventually be realized. 
See also CigarCafe. L.C. v. America Online. Inc.. 50 Va. Cir. 146, 162 (Va. Cir. Ct. 
1999) (forecast of projected profits developed by plaintiff and defendant "would be too 
speculative to use as evidence" of lost profits where the forecast was merely the estimates 
of the profits the parties hoped the joint venture would reap). 
Plaintiffs' reliance on Super Valu Stores. Inc. v. Peterson. 506 So. 2d 317, 330 
(Ala. 1987) is therefore misplaced. In Super Valu. an Alabama court permitted a lost 
profit award based on a party's pre-dispute projections because the projections resulted 
from "the application of a scientific methodology that for many years had accurately 
predicted the future performance of stores associated with Super Valu." 506 So. 2d at 
330. Here, there is no evidence that these "pre-dispute" business plans and appraisals 
would accurately have predicted the future success of Channel 13. In fact, the evidence 
shows that the optimistic business plans cited by plaintiffs quickly proved wrong and that 
Channel 13 was a failed venture that lost over $11 million in its first two years of 
operations. See Defs.' Br. at 85. 
The Seventh Circuit recently reiterated that "[d]amages must be proved, and not 
just dreamed." Mindgames. Inc. v. Western Publ'g Co.. 218 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 
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2000), reh'g denied. No. 98-1879, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21295 (7th Cir. Aug. 22, 
2000). The court cautioned that "[A] start-up company [like Channel 13] should not be 
permitted to obtain pie-in-the-sky damages upon allegations that it was snuffed out before 
it could begin to operate... capitalizing fantasized earnings into a huge present value 
sought as damages . . . . " Id. These comments fit this case exactly: the only thing Mr. 
Schutz did was capitalize fantasized earnings for a Channel 13 that never existed. 
Because the evidence supporting the damage awards was based on nothing more than 
speculation heaped upon conjecture, plaintiffs failed to establish damages with the 
requisite degree of certainty and this Court should vacate the jury's award of both lost 
ownership and cash distributions damages. 
C. The Cash Call Award Cannot Stand, 
As set forth more folly below, the "cash call" award against Wiley Rein and 
Richard Wiley is not sustainable. Even though plaintiffs admittedly suffered no harm as 
a result of the issuance of a memorandum that Northstar sent to plaintiffs notifying them 
of the need to make up the deficiencies in their limited partner capital accounts, the so-
called "cash call," see R.033408-033416 (DX 511), plaintiffs ask this Court to uphold the 
award and ignore the black letter rule that requires a plaintiff to establish that he or she 
suffer some actual injury before being entitled to recover damages, see* e^g., Atkin 
Wright & Miles, 709 P.2d at 336 (reversing judgment when plaintiff could not establish 
actual damages). It is undisputed that plaintiffs did not suffer (and never will suffer) any 
actual harm as a result of the cash call. Therefore, this Court should reject plaintiffs' 
efforts to retain such a windfall. 
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ARGUMENTS OF RICHARD WILEY 
VI. There Is No Basis For Personal Liability On The Part Of Richard Wiley. 
Plaintiffs attempt to make much of what Richard Wiley already has conceded: 
that, as a partner in Wiley Rein, he is liable for his share of any damages the firm may 
have caused plaintiffs. See Defs.' Br. at 92. Since a law firm is essentially one lawyer 
for purposes of fiduciary duties, each law firm member is vicariously bound by the 
ethical obligations of other lawyers in the firm and liable for a share of any damages the 
firm causes. 
Plaintiffs' citation to this legal truism, and their accompanying recitation of facts 
seeking to establish that Richard Wiley was bound by Wiley Rein's duties to plaintiffs, 
ignores Richard Wiley's arguments in this case. For by filing two separate claims in this 
action, with two special verdict forms, plaintiffs separately sought damages from both 
Wiley Rein and Richard Wiley personally. Moreover, the jury awarded plaintiffs 
damages (including punitive damages) against Mr. Wiley personally, over and above and 
in addition to the damages assessed against the firm. See R.20429-20443; R.20507-
20508. To receive compensatory and punitive damages from Richard Wiley personally, 
in addition to any damages he would be liable for as a member of Wiley Rein, plaintiffs 
were required to establish some personal attorney-client relationship between Richard 
Wiley and plaintiffs. See Sucese v. Kirsh. 606 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
Plaintiffs' refusal to acknowledge this fundamental distinction confirms that they 
seek, in essence, double recovery for the same conduct. For it is uncontroverted that Mr. 
Wiley did not have a personal attorney-client relationship with any individual plaintiffs at 
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anytime. See Defs.' Br. at 93-98 (citing record). Plaintiffs claim that the record shows 
that Richard Wiley had a personal attorney-client relationship with MWT Corp., the only 
plaintiff with whom the jury found Richard Wiley had an attorney-client relationship. In 
fact, the portions of the record cited show no such thing. See, e.g.. R.27176 at 73, 76-77 
(Mr. Wiley states that the firm represented MWT Ltd., not a party to this litigation, and 
its general partner MWT Corp.); R.29686-29729 (PX 302B) (time records show Mr. 
Wiley performing legal services for Northstar). That plaintiffs are forced to rely on such 
citations confirms that there is no evidence to support the jury's finding that Richard 
Wiley had a personal attorney-client relationship with MWT Corp. 
To the extent plaintiffs are entitled to recover any damages from Wiley Rein, 
Richard Wiley, as a partner in the firm, is responsible for his fair share. To require more 
of Richard Wiley (or any other Wiley Rein partner for that matter), without requiring 
plaintiffs to prove the existence of a personal attorney-client relationship, would violate 
basic tort law. See Williams v. Barber. 765 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988) (attorney 
malpractice actions require proof of an attorney-client relationship). There is no reason 
to rewrite Utah law to sustain the unjust verdict in this case. 
VII. The Court Cannot Affirm The Cash Call Award Because MWT Corp. Never 
Suffered Any Harm As A Result Of The Cash Call. 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to hold that individuals who never suffered any actual 
harm are nonetheless entitled to recover damages. See Pis.5 Br. at 103-06. Although 
plaintiffs wrongly assert that this is a sufficiency of the evidence issue, plaintiffs really 
want this Court to adopt a new rule of law that would permit plaintiffs to recover 
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damages based on Northstar's mere issuance of the "cash call" memo. See R.033408-
033416 (DX 511). Yet plaintiffs acknowledge that they never paid a dime as a result of 
the cash call, Northstar took no steps to recover against plaintiffs on the cash call, 
plaintiffs will never be required to pay the cash call, and plaintiffs have suffered no harm 
as a result of the cash call. As plaintiffs' star witness Joseph Lee testified, plaintiffs 
"haven't paid them [the cash calls]," plaintiffs "protested them," and "[t]here has been no 
suit [to collect them]." R.24794 at 76. The Court should reject yet another request by 
plaintiffs to ignore black letter law - this time, the rule that requires a plaintiff to 
establish that he or she has suffered or will suffer some quantifiable injury before 
recovering damages. See, e.g., Atkin Wright & Miles. 709 P.2d at 336 (reversing 
judgment when plaintiff could not establish actual damages). 
Once again, plaintiffs ignore the case law defendants cite in their opening brief. 
For example, plaintiffs do not discuss or even cite the recent decision of the Second 
Circuit holding that the mere receipt of a letter from a credit card company demanding 
payment of a debt did not establish actual damages, because there was "no evidence in 
the record that [plaintiff] paid the debt, acted in reliance on the letter, suffered emotional 
loss or harm, or responded to the letter in any way." Maguire v. Citicorp Retail Servs.. 
147 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1998). More telling, plaintiffs also pay no attention to their 
own liability expert who has written: "The mere possibility, or even probability, that the 
plaintiff will sustain an injury at some time does not alter the speculative nature of the 
damage claim or support a cause of action for legal malpractice." 2 Mallen, Legal 
Malpractice § 19.3, at 599-600 (emphasis added). 
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Rather than deal with this clear authority and their own expert's treatise, plaintiffs 
claim that the right to recover damages arises "when the plaintiff becomes legally bound 
to pay a bill or demand, even though the demand has not been paid at the time of trial." 
Pis.5 Br. at 104 (emphasis added). It goes without saying, however, that a request for 
payment does not, in and of itself, make plaintiffs "legally bound9' to do anything. 
Surely, had Northstar ever sought to recover the cash call amounts - and it never did -
plaintiffs would have vehemently denied any legal liability. In fact, Joseph Lee testified 
that plaintiffs "protested" the cash call memo when it was issued. See R.24794 at 76. 
Therefore, plaintiffs cannot claim that they became "legally obligated" to pay the cash 
call by merely receiving a memo from Northstar. 
Plaintiffs also refuse to accept the undoubted fact that they cannot now be "legally 
bound" to pay the cash call. As explained in defendants' opening brief, any claim to 
recover on the cash call is barred because the limitations period ran before trial even 
The cases plaintiffs cite in support of this proposition merely hold that, when it is 
undisputed that the plaintiff will have to pay a debt in the future, a plaintiff is entitled to 
recover for damages a plaintiff actually has suffered. See Wilson v. Southern Pac. Co.. 
44 P. 1040, 1042 (Utah 1896) (allowing recovery for medical expenses incurred as a 
result of injuries sustained when train hit plaintiff even though the medical bills had not 
been paid as of the date of trial); Wilson Leasing Co. v. Seaway Pharm. Corp., 220 
N.W.2d 83, 87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (allowing recovery for financial liability incurred, 
even though not actually paid at time of trial, when "the liability must eventually be 
satisfied"); Barilla v. Gunn Buick-Cadillac-GMC Inc., 528 N.Y.S.2d 273, 280 (Oswego 
Cty. Ct. 1988) (allowing recovery for expenses incurred as a result of breach of a used car 
warranty where plaintiff was legally liable to pay the amount although she had not done 
so). None of these cases deals with a situation where, as here, a plaintiff did not suffer 
any damages as a result of a request for payment, is not legally bound to make any 
payment merely due to the issuance of the request, and can never in the future be required 
to make any payments pursuant to the request. 
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commenced. See Defs.' Br. at 101. The District Court took judicial notice that the 
statute of limitations for claims based on the cash call was six years, that the limitations 
period began to run in 1991, and that as of 1998 (seven years later) no one had sought to 
enforce the cash call. R.27121 at 132-136. Plaintiffs do not challenge these rulings. 
While the District Court did suggest that there was a remote possibility that at trial 
plaintiffs could produce some facts establishing that the statute of limitations on the cash 
call had been tolled, see id, plaintiffs never presented any such evidence, because there is 
none. More important, to this day plaintiffs have not provided a shred of evidence that 
they suffered amy harm by receiving the cash call. See Pis.' Br. at 103-106. Actual harm, 
not the hypothetical "risk of a multi-million dollar liability," id. at 103, is what is required 
to prove liability and damages, se^ e^g., Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993), afFd, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996); Atkin Wright & Miles. 709 P.2d at 336; 
Semenza v. Nevada Med. Liab. Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 184,186 (Nev. 1988). 
In short, this Court should not permit any recovery for cash call damages because 
plaintiffs admit that neither MWT Corp. (the only plaintiff to whom the jury awarded 
cash call damages), nor any other plaintiff, suffered any actual harm as a result of the 
cash call. Allowing this award to stand would give plaintiffs an impermissible windfall 
of $184,000 in clear violation of Utah law that a plaintiff "may not recover... more than 
his actual damages." Nelson ex rel. Hirschfeld v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop. 
935 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1997). This Court should, therefore, vacate the jury's award of 
cash call damages against both Mr. Wiley and Wiley Rein. 
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VIII. There Is No Justification For A Punitive Damage Award Against Mr. Wiley. 
Plaintiffs agree that a jury may only award punitive damages if plaintiffs are 
entitled to recover compensatory damages. See Pis.' Br. at 110. Because cash call 
damages were the only compensatory damages that the jury awarded against Richard 
Wiley and because there is no basis for that award, this Court must also set aside the 
jury's punitive damage award against Mr. Wiley. Defs.' Br. at 98-102; C.T. v. Johnson. 
1999 UT 35, % 15, 977 P.2d 479, 483 (noting that this requirement "assure[s] that 
punitive damages cannot be recovered where the plaintiff did not sustain any monetary 
loss or injury"). 
Even if this Court were to sustain the cash call award, however, there is no 
evidence supporting the punitive damage award against Richard Wiley. Plaintiffs argue 
that punitive damages need not relate to the conduct giving rise to the compensatory 
damage award. See Pis.' Br. at 111. But that is not the law in Utah. This Court in Cook 
Assocs.. Inc. v. Warnick. 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983), held that punitive damages must be 
tied to tortious conduct. As this Court put it, there must be "an award of compensatory 
damages to which such punitive damages [can] be ascribed." Id at 1168; see also 
DiPrima v. DiPrima. 490 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (finding attorney 
engaged in "deceit or collusion," but rejecting punitive damages because conduct was 
unrelated to plaintiffs injury). Plaintiffs also neglect to follow the teachings of their own 
trial expert, who has written that punitive damages must relate to the acts causing the 
harm for which compensatory damages are awarded. See 2 Mallen, Legal Malpractice 
§ 19.16, at 625 ("[T]he conduct that supports a punitive damages claim must bear a 
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relationship to the wrongs that are the basis of the legal malpractice claim."). As a 
consequence, plaintiffs' claims that Richard Wiley acted with malice or fraudulent intent 
during the period before the cash call-assertions that are not supported by the record -
are irrelevant. Those allegations have no bearing on the 1991 cash call, the only injury 
that was the basis for the jury's compensatory damage award against Mr. Wiley. 
Finally, plaintiffs' list of the alleged evils Richard Wiley committed before the 
cash call, Pis.' Br. at 111-14, merely demonstrates that he was representing the interests 
of Northstar (as both a Northstar board member and attorney for Northstar), not that he 
was "willfully, knowingly and recklessly disregarding] the rights of MWT Corp.," an 
entity with which Mr. Wiley never had an attorney-client relationship and that was 
separately represented by Ralph Hardy in all of its dealings with Northstar. See Defs.' 
Br. at 26, 91-97 (citing record). 
Moreover, at the time the cash call was issued, Wiley Rein no longer represented 
any plaintiff. There was no evidence that Richard Wiley, who merely served as a director 
of Northstar, had any direct involvement in the sending of the cash call, which simply 
notified the limited partners in accordance with the MWT Ltd. Agreement of the need to 
fund negative balances in their capital accounts. See Defs.' Br. at 29-30, 103-04 (citing 
record). Mr. Wiley cannot be punished for Northstar's exercise of its contractual 
obligation as MWT's general partner to issue the cash call. Mere conclusory assertions 
that Richard Wiley acted with malice in carrying out his responsibilities as a Northstar 
director (notably, not as plaintiffs' lawyer), Pis.' Br. at 112, do not rise to the level of 
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"outrageous conduct" or "exceptional case" for which punitive damages are warranted. 
See* e ^ , Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 807 (Utah 1991). 
In this case, malice is nonexistent. Plaintiffs' efforts to demonize Mr. Wiley 
cannot substitute for evidence. Accordingly, the Court should set aside the punitive 
damage award against Mr. Wiley. 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS9 "CROSS-APPEAL" 
In a tacit recognition that the District Court's errors require reversal of the 
judgment and a new trial, plaintiffs ask this Court to provide advisory opinions on issues 
they assert will recur upon remand. The Court should reject plaintiffs' request. First, this 
Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs' purported "cross-appeal." Second, not one of 
plaintiffs' arguments has any merit. 
I. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over The "Cross-Appeal." 
Plaintiffs' "cross-appeal" is not proper - and this Court lacks jurisdiction over it -
because plaintiffs do not seek to alter the judgment of the District Court. Indeed, 
plaintiffs concede that they "accept the jury's verdict and the trial court's judgment on the 
verdict." See Pis.' Br. at 3, 114. As this Court has emphasized, "[i]t is important to 
remember that a cross-appeal is a separate appeal raising distinct issues for review" and 
"a cross-appeal must be able to stand on its own." MacKay v. Hardy. 973 P.2d 941, 949 
n.ll (Utah 1998). Here, plaintiffs' "cross-appeal" does not - and cannot - "stand on its 
own" because under well-settled Utah law, a cross-appeal is proper only if a party is 
seeking to "attack a judgment of a trial court for the purpose of enlarging their own rights 
or lessening the rights of their opponent." Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr.. 1999 UT 69, 
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Tf 7, 983 P.2d 575, 578 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If a party merely 
desires affirmance of the lower court's judgment it must not, and should not, cross-
appeal. State v. South. 924 P.2d 354, 356 (Utah 1996).21 
"Cross-appeals are properly limited to grievances a party has with the judgment as 
it was entered -not grievances it might acquire depending on the outcome of the appeal." 
Halladav v. Cluff. 739 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In other words, a cross-
appeal is not a vehicle to seek advisory opinions from this Court in the event of a new 
trial. Good reasons exist for this rule. '"Unnecessary cross-appeals . . . multiply the 
number of briefs filed and lead to confusion of the issues presented." South. 924 P.2d at 
356; see also Jordan v. Duff & Phelps. Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 439 (7th Cir. 1987) (cross-
appeals by parties receiving judgments in their favor unnecessarily "disrupt the briefing 
schedule, increasing from three to four the number of briefs, and they make the case less 
readily understandable to the judges"). 
In the present case, this Court's admonition in South is particularly relevant. 
Plaintiffs apparently filed this improper cross-appeal so they could obtain the last word in 
this appeal - an additional 25-page reply brief of issues that plaintiffs themselves concede 
21
 Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' "cross-appeal" promptly after it was filed. See 
Oct. 29, 1999 Motion to Dismiss. Because the Court deferred ruling on the Motion to 
Dismiss, defendants now renew their Motion and incorporate in this brief the arguments 
set forth in their Motion. 
22
 Although conditional cross-appeals are permitted by some courts, they are appropriate 
only when a party is seeking to overturn or modify a judgment of a lower court and are 
not proper vehicles to seek advisory opinions on rulings made during the trial. See 
Defendants' Nov. 24, 1999 Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Cross-Appeal at 5-9 
(citing cases). 
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are only contingent. Plaintiffs' novel approach to cross-appeals is contrary to the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and undermines the orderly processing of appeals. This 
Court should dismiss the cross-appeal. 
II. The District Court Did Not Err By Refusing To Rule As A Matter Of Law 
That Richard Wiley Had An Attorney-Client Relationship With Plaintiffs. 
Once again, plaintiffs argue a point defendants concede - all members of a law 
firm owe duties of loyalty to the firm's clients. See Pis.' Br. at 115-116. However, 
because plaintiffs sued Richard Wiley personally -separate and apart from his status as a 
partner of Wiley Rein - they cannot recover against him based merely upon his 
membership in the firm. To recover against Richard Wiley, plaintiffs had to present 
evidence establishing the existence of a personal attorney-client relationship between 
plaintiffs and Richard Wiley. Plaintiffs failed to do so below and do not now marshal 
any evidence establishing that Richard Wiley had a personal attorney-client relationship 
with any plaintiff. See Pis.' Br. at 114-116. The District Court was therefore correct to 
reject plaintiffs' request to skip the threshold factual question and rule that, as a matter of 
law, Richard Wiley 6Chad an attorney-client relationship with any plaintiff who is found to 
be a client of [Wiley Rein]." kL at 116. See Sorenson, 585 P.2d at 460. 
Plaintiffs cannot separately recover against Richard Wiley merely by resting on 
the legal principle that each attorney of a firm owes a fiduciary duty to each client of the 
firm. Pis.' Br. at 115. To allow plaintiffs to recover against Richard Wiley on this basis 
Worse yet, plaintiffs may even have filed their "cross-appeal" with the intent to use 
their cross-appeal reply as an impermissible sur-reply to the points raised in defendants' 
reply to plaintiffs' opposition brief. See Utah R. App. P. 24(c). 
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alone - without any showing that he had a personal attorney-client relationship with any 
plaintiff and without any showing that he breached a personal duty owed to plaintiffs -
would permit plaintiffs an impermissible double recovery for the identical claims 
asserted against Wiley Rein. 
III. The District Court Should Not Have Admitted The Indemnity Agreements 
Between Allstate And Defendants To Prove Defendants9 Liability. 
Plaintiffs' argument that the indemnity agreements between Allstate, Richard 
Wiley and Wiley Rein should have been admitted as evidence of defendants' "liability, 
intent and malice," Pis.' Br. at 122, is wrong for two reasons. First, if anything, the 
indemnity agreements should not have been admitted for any purpose, as evidence of 
these agreements was unfairly prejudicial and likely confused the jury. As a result, if this 
Court deems it appropriate to give guidance to the District Court on this issue at all, it 
should tell the court that the indemnity agreements should not be admitted into evidence 
at any new trial. Second, at a minimum, the court correctly ruled that the indemnity 
agreements could not be used to prove misconduct. 
First, evidence of the indemnity agreements should have been excluded in their 
entirety. Even if there was an evidentiary foundation for the admission of the indemnity 
agreements for the purpose of showing bias, control or prejudice - the only uses 
permitted by the District Court, see R.27119 (Nov. 18, 1998 Ruling at 20-21) - the 
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value of this evidence. 
See Utah R. Evid. 403; see, e ^ , Braun v. Lorillard. No. 94-C796, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
205, at *4 (N.D. 111. Jan. 10, 1996) (excluding evidence of indemnity agreement offered 
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to show bias where "existence of the indemnity agreement is likely to distract the jury 
from essential issues which it is to resolve in a detached manner"), afPd, 84 F.3d 230 
(7th Cir. 1996); Delicious Foods Co. v. Milliard Warehouse, 507 N.W.2d 631, 639-40 
(Neb. 1993) (evidence that did not qualify for exclusion as "liability insurance" under 
Rule 411 must still be excluded to establish liability because the probative value of the 
evidence far outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice; if the jury learned that plaintiffs 
loss was fully covered by another party, "the jury would decide the issue of [defendant's] 
liability on the basis that [plaintiff] suffered no great damage"). 
In October 1989, ten months after Channel 13 was put up for sale, Allstate entered 
into an indemnity agreement with Richard Wiley. R.29323-29328 (PX 255). At that 
time Allstate (through its subsidiary Farragut Communications) owned Northstar, and 
Northstar was the general partner of MWT Ltd. Id. Mr. Wiley was one of Northstar5 s 
two directors. R.27112 at 125-126. Angered over Northstar's pending acceptance of the 
Fox bid to purchase Channel 13, plaintiffs threatened to sue Northstar and its directors, 
including Mr. Wiley, if they proceeded with the sale. In order to retain Mr. Wiley as 
director of Northstar, Allstate promised to hold him harmless for any liability incurred as 
a result of his remaining as a director - including any liability resulting from plaintiffs' 
threatened lawsuit. R.29323-29328 (PX 255). After plaintiffs filed their suit against 
defendants, Allstate amended the indemnity agreement to extend its protection to Wiley 
Rein. R.29485-29488 (PX 279). 
The indemnity agreements had no probative value, but they were highly 
prejudicial. They portrayed defendants as being covered by a "deep pocket" (i.e., 
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Allstate) and thereby facing no real liability. See, e.g.. Figueroa v. City of Chicago. No. 
97-C8861, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5661, at *3 (N.D. 111. April 24, 2000) (evidence that 
defendants would be indemnified by the City of Chicago's "deep pockets" excluded 
under Rule 403 as such evidence was "unfairly prejudicial"). Knowledge of the 
agreements also impermissibly permitted the jury to enter a multi-million dollar liability 
verdict against defendants to punish Allstate and its subsidiary Northstar for what 
plaintiffs strenuously contended throughout trial was wrongdoing by Allstate and 
Northstar.24 Accordingly, the District Court should never have permitted plaintiffs to 
admit the indemnity agreements at all. See DeMary v. Rieker. 695 A.2d 294, 303 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (error to admit indemnification agreement where agreement 
"may have given the jury the impression that in returning a large verdict against 
[defendant], it was also punishing [the indemnifying party]"). 
Second, plaintiffs' argument that the District Court erred in limiting the admission 
of the indemnity agreements is founded on the false premise that the District Court held 
the agreements were governed by Rule 411. Pis.' Br. at 45, 119. In fact, the District 
Court ruling that plaintiffs challenge (but do not quote) shows clearly that the court 
concluded that Rule 411 did not apply. Nevertheless, recognizing that admitting these 
agreements in evidence to establish that defendants breached fiduciary duties was wholly 
24
 See* e ^ , R.24939 at 33 (Joseph Lee testifying that Northstar's failure to provide $2.6 
million in financing for Channel 13 after Sidney Foulger defaulted on his loan 
commitment "was the downfall of the whole thing"); R.21748 at 57-60 (due to the 
inadequate financing by Allstate and Allstate's "decision to move forward with the sale 
[of Channel 13]," plaintiffs' "valuable interest in Channel 13 was successively whittled 
away to nothing"). 
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inappropriate and would be severely prejudicial, the District Court exercised its discretion 
to limit the purpose for which the jury could use the indemnity agreements. See R.27119 
(Nov. 18, 1998 Ruling at 20-24) ("I am persuaded that Rule 411 is not technically 
applicable in this matter However, the principals behind this [rule]. . . is similar 
enough to Rule 411 to look at 411 for guidance into the prejudicial effect of admitting the 
existence of this indemnity agreement."); see also R.20354 (Jury Inst. No. 14). 
Though not expressly stated in its ruling, it is evident that the District Court 
applied Rule 403 - that relevant evidence may be excluded if there is a "danger of unfair 
prejudice." See Utah R. Evid. 403; see also Nay, 850 P.2d at 1262 ("Although the court 
did not identify the rule of evidence on which it based its determination, [its] 
language . . . indicates that the court found the evidence unfairly prejudicial under Utah 
Rule of Evidence 403 . . . . We [therefore] review [the] trial court's determination... for 
abuse of discretion . . . . " ) . The reason for plaintiffs' distortion of the court's ruling is 
clear -plaintiffs want this Court to believe that the District Court made an "error of law," 
to obtain de novo review of this issue, rather than face the impossible task of 
demonstrating that the court abused its discretion when it properly ruled that because 
evidence related to the indemnity agreements would unfairly affect the jury's liability 
determination, such evidence could not be used to establish wrongdoing. Pis.' Br. at 4. 
As this Court has consistently held, rulings regarding admissibility of evidence 
under Rule 403 are reviewed for abuse of discretion and will be reversed only if the 
ruling "is beyond the bounds of reasonability" and a party can show harm resulting from 
the error. Nay, 850 P.2d at 1262. Plaintiffs never argue that the District Court's ruling 
was "beyond the bounds of reasonability" or even state how they were harmed by the 
court's ruling. These failures alone warrant rejection of plaintiffs' claim of error. 
The District Court properly recognized that there was no connection between an 
indemnity agreement aimed at keeping Richard Wiley as a director of Northstar and any 
alleged breaches of his fiduciary duties as a lawyer before the date of the agreement. See 
R.29323-29328 (PX 255). Further, it is not possible that the indemnity agreement 
between Allstate and Wiley Rein - which was undisputedly entered into after this lawsuit 
was filed and thus after the actions giving rise to the lawsuit had occurred - had any 
relevance whatsoever to whether defendants did in fact breach any duties owed to 
plaintiffs. See R.29485-29488 (PX 279).25 
This Court should, therefore, direct the court overseeing any new trial to rule that 
the indemnification agreements (and any evidence related to them) are inadmissible as 
evidence of liability. Furthermore, these agreements should not even be admitted for the 
limited purposes of showing control, bias or witness prejudice because their prejudice far 
outweighs whatever probative value they may have. 
IV. The District Court Correctly Excluded The Appraisal And Testimony Of 
Albin Seethaler. 
The District Court properly excluded Albin Seethaler's appraisal, R.30378-30383 
(PX 322), and his testimony because the court found that this evidence was not relevant 
Plaintiffs provide no record support (because there is none) for their unfounded claim 
that defendants must have "believed they may have breached their duties to plaintiffs" 
because they received indemnification for "past actions." See Pis.' Br. at 121-22. It is 
precisely this type of argument that shows why admitting the indemnity agreements was 
so prejudicial to defendants. 
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to any measure of damages related to plaintiffs' claims. Mr. Seethaler was offered by 
plaintiffs to provide an opinion that the market value of a Fox-owned Channel 13 in 1998 
was $149.5 million. Pis.' Br. at 122-123. Mr. Seethaler's appraisal and testimony were 
inadmissible and utterly irrelevant to plaintiffs' damages in this case because: (1) the 
1998 value of a Channel 13 owned by Fox bore no relevance to any damages resulting 
from alleged '"breaches of fiduciary duties in the 1990 time frame," Pis.' Br. at 123; and 
(2) Mr. Seethaler's appraisal was speculative and based on the hypothesized revenues of 
a Fox-owned Channel 13. The District Court therefore correctly excluded this proffered 
evidence. Furthermore, because plaintiffs fail to challenge the District Court's 
determination that Mr. Seethaler's appraisal and testimony should also be excluded 
because it was prejudicial and would confuse the jury, the District Court's ruling should 
not be disturbed. 
First, the 1998 market value of a Channel 13 run by a national media giant has no 
conceivable bearing on damages plaintiffs suffered between 1987 and, at the latest, 1990, 
when that station was sold to Fox. As the District Court noted, "if the plaintiffs sold the 
station in April of 1990, how can the position then be [that] they're then entitled to the 
appreciated value from 1990 to 1998?" R.27127 (Oct. 27 1998 Ruling at 74-75). In 
other words, the Court recognized that eight years of ownership and management by a 
successful broadcast network necessarily affected the value of the station and thus 
stripped the evidence of any conceivable relevance to the claims in this lawsuit. 
Accordingly, the court properly excluded Mr. Seethaler's appraisal "for the purpose of 
establishing the present value of a lost business opportunity " IdL at 76. See State v. 
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Kohl. 2000 UT 35, f 17, 999 P.2d 7, 12-13 (court has "broad discretion to determine 
whether proffered evidence is relevant," and error is found "only if the trial court has 
abused its discretion") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Slisze v. Stanley-
Bostitoh, 1999 UT 20,117, 979 P.2d 317, 321. 
Second, Mr. Seethaler's figures were completely speculative and thus legally 
insufficient to form a proper basis for awarding damages. See, e.g.. Canyon Country. 781 
P.2d at 414. Admittedly, however, Mr. Seethaler's own testimony does not bear out the 
District Court's finding. Mr. Seethaler admitted that he did not use any actual historical 
numbers or information in arriving at his 1998 appraised value of the Fox-owned 
Channel 13, even though the station had been owned and operated by Fox for eight years 
at the time of Mr. Seethaler's appraisal, and historical operating information existed. 
R.27127 at 29, 34-37. The failure to use actual historical numbers in his appraisal is all 
the more strildng because plaintiffs never made any attempts to obtain the information 
from Fox, by subpoena or otherwise. Id at 33-34. Damage evidence (such as an 
appraisal) based on estimates and guesses rather than on available historic data is 
speculative. See, e ^ , Brown v. McIBS. Inc.. 722 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Mo. App. 1986) (to 
prove lost profits for an existing business "[i]t is indispensable that this proof include the 
income and expenses of the business for a reasonable anterior period"). Mr. Seethaler's 
appraisal and testimony should therefore also be excluded on this alternative basis. 
Finally, plaintiffs' challenge to the District Court's ruling is fatally flawed because 
plaintiffs focus on only one part of the court's ruling - that the proffered appraisal was 
irrelevant -bu t fail to challenge (or even address) the District Court's alternative reasons 
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for excluding Mr. Seethaler's appraisal and testimony. These additional reasons were as 
follows: (1) Mr. Seethaler's appraisal "would be more prejudicial than probative" 
because it was offered to value an opportunity lost by plaintiffs' in 1990 but did not 
account for the fact that by 1998, Channel 13 had been in the hands of the extremely 
successful Fox network for eight years; and (2) Mr. Seethaler's testimony would not aid 
the jury because it was based on "a horrendously confusing set of facts and numbers and 
theories and assumptions." See R.27127 (Oct. 22, 1998 Ruling at 76-78). Since 
plaintiffs never challenged these portions of the District Court's ruling, this Court should 
affirm the court's decision to bar admission of Mr. Seethaler's appraisal and testimony. 
See, e.g.. American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech.. Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 n.5 
(Utah 1996) ("Issues not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived and abandoned."). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in defendants' opening brief, the verdict and 
judgment against Wiley Rein should be reversed and judgment should enter in its favor 
that: (1) Wiley Rein did not have an attorney-client relationship with any plaintiff after 
May 1988, (2) Wiley Rein did not breach its duty of confidentiality to any plaintiff, 
(3) plaintiffs are not entitled to lost ownership damages, (4) plaintiffs are not entitled to 
cash distribution damages, and (5) plaintiffs are not entitled to cash call damages; any 
issues remaining thereafter should be remanded to the District Court for a new trial on 
both liability and damages. The verdict and judgment against Richard Wiley should also 
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be entirely vacated and judgment should enter in his favor on all claims. In the 
alternative, the Court should vacate the judgment against each defendant and grant each 
defendant a new trial on both liability and damages. 
In addition, for the reasons set forth above and in defendants' previously filed 
Motion to Dismiss, plaintiffs' purported "cross-appeal" should be dismissed. 
Alternatively, the Court should affirm the District Court's rulings challenged by plaintiffs 
and direct the court overseeing any new trial that: (1) Richard Wiley does not have an 
attorney-client relationship with any plaintiff, (2) evidence regarding the indemnification 
agreements between Allstate, Wiley Rein and Richard Wiley is inadmissible for any 
purpose, and (3) the appraisal and testimony of Albin Seethaler is inadmissible. 
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Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of November, 2000. 
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